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INTRODUCTION 
In the 2017 case Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the United States 
Supreme Court addressed the problem of racial bias in our justice 
system.1 The Court acknowledged that racial discrimination, “odious 
in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the administration of justice.”2 
The Court identified the jury as a criminal defendant’s primary 
protection against racial prejudice.3 The Court stated that, based on 
this principle, the justice system must identify methods to ferret out 
racial prejudice among jurors.4 Otherwise, the integrity of the jury trial 
system will be compromised. The Court noted that racial bias is a 
“familiar and recurring evil that, if left un[checked], would risk 
systemic injury to the administration of justice.”5 
The Pena-Rodriguez Court recognized several safeguards that 
are in place to assist the trial court in identifying racial bias among 
jurors. These safeguards include voir dire examination regarding 
racial bias, jury instructions addressing racial bias, observation of 
juror demeanor and conduct that might demonstrate racial bias, reports 
of racially biased comments or actions by jurors during trial, and non-
juror evidence of racial bias after trial.6 The Court acknowledged that 
these safeguards may be insufficient at times and therefore added an 
additional one, holding that the Sixth Amendment requires trial courts 
to review evidence suggesting that racial bias was a motivating factor 
in a juror’s decision to convict a criminal defendant even when the 
evidence of bias rears its head during otherwise non-impeachable jury 
deliberations.7  
This Article will demonstrate that the safeguards identified by 
the Court must be improved if they are to assist trial courts in ferreting 
out juror bias. Social science research has made clear that a majority 
of Americans carry some level of subconscious or implicit bias against 
racial minorities and that this bias manifests itself in the application of 
racial stereotypes. These stereotypes can influence many aspects of 
the jury’s functions. Until courts and legislatures are willing to craft 
                                                   
 1. See generally Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017). For a 
description of the facts of the case, see infra Part II. 
 2. Id. at 868 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)). 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See id. at 866, 871. 
 7. See id. at 869. 
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safeguards that will address the impact of bias head-on, the jury 
system will continue to be infiltrated with bias. 
I believe that the first step in ridding the jury system of racial 
bias is to tell the truth about the prevalence and effect of bias. This 
includes naming the stereotypes that are at play whenever a person of 
color enters a courtroom. Through honest, open dialogue, which is a 
hallmark of the truth and reconciliation process, we can begin to chip 
away at the justice system’s tradition of discrimination. I acknowledge 
that these truths may make us uncomfortable, but the truth and 
reconciliation process tells us that we can heal only after we have sat 
in the discomfort. 
Part I of this Article will explore the prevalence and impact of 
racial bias among jurors.8 This Part will review the social science 
research establishing that bias, whether conscious or unconscious, 
affects the way we perceive those who are different from us.9 This Part 
will also name many widely known stereotypes about minorities and 
discuss how those stereotypes affect the jury’s core functions of 
character assessment, witness credibility assessment, and fact 
interpretation and recall.10 Part II will briefly review the facts of Pena-
Rodriguez and discuss the two preemptive safeguards that purportedly 
protect minorities from racial discrimination in the courtroom.11 This 
Part will demonstrate that those two safeguards, voir dire and jury 
instructions, are not universally available to criminal defendants and, 
when used, are not always effective.12 Finally, Part III will detail my 
proposals for improving voir dire and jury instructions in a way that 
places the truth at the forefront and moves our system toward an open 
discussion of racial bias in the courtroom.13 
                                                   
 8. See infra Part I (exploring the prevalence and impact of racial bias among 
jurors). 
 9. See id. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See infra Part II (reviewing the facts of Pena-Rodriguez and discussing 
the two preemptive safeguards that purportedly protect minorities from racial 
discrimination in the courtroom). 
 12. See id. 
 13. See infra Part III (detailing proposals for improving voir dire and jury 
instructions in a way that places the truth at the forefront and moves our system toward 
an open discussion of racial bias in the courtroom). 
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I. THE PREVALENCE AND IMPACT OF RACIAL BIAS AMONG JURORS 
Jurors, like other people, sometimes harbor racial and ethnic 
biases.14 Social scientists and legal scholars have conducted research 
on the origins and implications of juror bias. Samuel Sommers and 
Phoebe Ellsworth have published several studies on race and juries.15 
In 2003, they summarized two decades of research on juror bias, 
finding that it supports the existence of White juror bias against Black 
defendants and that this bias impacts jury decisions regarding Black 
defendants’ guilt as well as sentencing recommendations.16 Sommers 
and Ellsworth also found that crime type impacts the likelihood of 
bias, concluding that jurors are more likely to show racial bias when 
defendants are accused of crimes stereotypically associated with their 
race.17 They determined that “White jurors viewed white-collar 
crimes––such as counterfeiting and embezzlement––as consistent 
with a stereotype of White criminals. On the other hand, more violent 
crimes such as assault and robbery were associated with a Black 
criminal stereotype.”18 Thus, a Black defendant who is accused of 
committing a stereotypically violent crime is more likely to face racial 
bias.19 Importantly, Sommers and Ellsworth concluded that racial bias 
is not unique to White jurors.20 Their research revealed that Black 
jurors are also affected by the race of the defendant: “Compared to 
their judgments of the White defendant, Black jurors in our study gave 
lower guilt ratings, shorter sentence recommendations, and more 
positive personality evaluations to the Black defendant . . . .”21  
                                                   
 14. See Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal 
Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 739 (1995) (“Ethnic 
attitudes are a part of the social heritage of the developing child. They are transmitted 
across generations as a component of the accumulated knowledge of society. No 
person can grow up in a society without learning the prevailing attitudes concerning 
the major ethnic groups.”). 
 15. See generally Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much 
Do We Really Know about Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and 
Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997 (2003).  
 16. See id. at 1006. 
 17. See id. at 1007-08. 
 18. Id.  
 19. See id. 
 20. See id. at 1019-20. 
 21. Id. Sommers and Ellsworth theorize that the origins of White juror bias 
are quite different than the origins of Black juror bias. See id. They have found that 
White jurors often rely on anti-Black stereotypes and long-held prejudicial attitudes 
when evaluating Black defendants, while Black jurors’ concern about the fairness of 
 Bias on Trial 1247 
In 2015, Jennifer S. Hunt conducted a review of ten years’ of 
research and concluded that “the race and ethnicity of defendants, 
victims, and jurors can impact the outcomes of criminal trials.”22 Hunt 
found that jurors in noncapital cases tend to judge more harshly 
defendants from other racial or ethnic groups.23 Additionally, she 
found that the race of the victim was significant in capital cases, with 
jurors being more likely to recommend the death penalty when 
African–American or Latino defendants are accused of killing White 
victims.24 Hunt theorized that a victim’s race is significant in capital 
cases because jurors may reflect on the value of the victim’s life when 
determining whether the death penalty is appropriate.25  
Racial bias among jurors may be explicit or implicit. Social 
scientists and legal scholars define explicit biases as “attitudes and 
stereotypes that are consciously accessible through introspection.”26 
Where explicit biases are socially accepted, individuals are likely to 
share them; however, where these biases are socially unacceptable, 
they are more likely to remain hidden.27 Implicit or unconscious 
biases, on the other hand, are “attitudes and stereotypes that are not 
consciously accessible through introspection.”28  
Many legal scholars have focused their research on enlightening 
the legal community about the prevalence of implicit bias and offering 
solutions for how the justice system can reduce or eliminate the impact 
of implicit bias.29 Michael Selmi argues that the legal academy’s 
tendency to label bias as implicit actually limits the liability of bad 
                                                   
the legal system might lead them to impose a higher burden of proof on the 
government when the defendant is African American. See id. at 1011, 1020-21. 
 22. Jennifer S. Hunt, Race, Ethnicity, and Culture in Jury Decision Making, 
11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 269, 270, 273 (2015). 
 23. See id.  
 24. See id. Hunt also found that White men are more likely to show bias 
against African–American defendants in capital cases. See id.  
 25. See id. Hunt’s theory implies that jurors assess greater value to the lives 
of White victims as compared to the lives of Black victims. See id.  
 26. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 
1132 (2012). The authors define the term “attitude” as “an association between some 
concept (in this case a social group) and an evaluative valence, either positive or 
negative.” Id. at 1128. They define a “stereotype” as “an association between a 
concept (again, in this case a social group) and a trait.” Id. 
 27. See id. at 1132. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Michael Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias and a Plea for a New 
Narrative, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 193, 195 n.5 (2018) (citing studies and stating that 
“[i]mplicit bias has had a particularly strong pull among legal academics, and in the 
last decade, articles espousing the prevalence of implicit bias have proliferated”). 
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actors and gives them an excuse to continue their biased behavior.30 
He points out that many well-known examples of implicit bias, such 
as the hypothetical police officer who assumes that an African–
American man is engaging in criminal activity or the school principal 
who punishes misbehaving Black children more harshly than similarly 
situated White students, actually demonstrate intentionally 
discriminatory conduct that may be motivated by implicit attitudes.31 
Selmi argues that legal scholars’ focus on the implicit nature of the 
attitudes rather than the intentional nature of the conduct has had the 
effect of limiting legal liability for intentional discrimination while 
also giving the biased actor an excuse of sorts.32 After all, the actor 
may feel blameless if it is true that we are all impacted by 
subconscious biases that we cannot control.33 For this reason, Selmi 
encourages scholars to adjust their narratives to a discussion of 
stereotypes rather than implicit bias.34  
Regardless of the level of awareness individuals have 
concerning their bias, it is evident that racial and ethnic stereotypes 
are pervasive in American society. Stereotypes are defined as “well-
learned sets of associations among groups and traits established in 
children’s memories at an early age, before they have the cognitive 
skills to decide rationally upon the personal acceptability of the 
stereotypes.”35 For example, a child might learn at an early age that 
African Americans are associated with crime or that Latinos are 
associated with illegal immigration.36 Although these associations 
                                                   
 30. See id. at 223. 
 31. See id. at 199. 
 32. See id. at 223. 
 33. See id.  
 34. See id. at 239-40 (noting that social scientists and legal scholars use the 
terms “implicit bias” and “stereotypes” interchangeably and stating that “it is clear 
that, more often than not, what scholars mean by implicit bias is that an individual is 
acting on an ingrained stereotype—associating African Americans, for example, with 
criminality or women with children and a likelihood to leave the workplace when they 
have children”). 
 35. Armour, supra note 14, at 741.  
 36. Charles Lawrence III has theorized that although stereotypes are “tacitly 
transmitted,” they nevertheless influence our decisions:  
If an individual has never known a black doctor or lawyer or is exposed to 
blacks only through a mass media where they are portrayed in the 
stereotyped roles of comedian, criminal, musician, or athlete, he is likely 
to deduce that blacks as a group are naturally inclined toward certain 
behavior and unfit for certain roles. But the lesson is not explicit: It is 
learned, internalized, and used without an awareness of its source. 
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develop when individuals are very young, researchers have 
determined that adults rely upon stereotypes in very specific 
situations. First, stereotypes significantly influence individuals who 
are not motivated to seek individuating information about members of 
stereotyped groups.37 Additionally, individuals who are under stress or 
who are pressed for time are more likely to rely upon stereotypes.38 
Finally, as stated earlier, researchers have found that jurors tend to 
make decisions based on stereotypes where the defendant is accused 
of a crime that is “stereotypically associated” with the defendant’s 
racial group and that jurors will punish these defendants more 
severely.39 
To fully understand racial stereotypes and their impact on jurors, 
it is necessary to identify some of the most common stereotypes that a 
defendant of color may be forced to contend with in court. In 
American society, race functions as a proxy for an extensive list of 
characteristics.40 We tend to associate people of color with 
“undesirable personal qualities such as laziness, incompetence, and 
hostility, as well as disfavored political viewpoints such as lack of 
patriotism or disloyalty to the United States.”41 Researchers have 
found that biased individuals rely upon two types of stereotypes: 
“They believe the out-group is dirty, lazy, oversexed, and without 
control of their instincts (a typical accusation against blacks), or they 
                                                   
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 343 (1987). 
 37. See Melinda Jones, Preventing the Application of Stereotypic Biases in 
the Courtroom: The Role of Detailed Testimony, 20 J. APP. SOC. PSY. 1767, 1768 
(1997) (stating that “stereotypes operate as simplifying heuristics that exert a greater 
influence when individuals are either insufficiently motivated to seek accurate 
impressions or when their information processing abilities are taxed” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 38. See Lu-in Wang, Race as Proxy: Situational Racism and Self-Fulfilling 
Stereotypes, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1013, 1071-72 (2004) (“[T]he perceiver may be 
under too much stress or too busy to do much more than rely on cognitive and 
behavioral shortcuts. People who are aroused or under greater cognitive load may rely 
more heavily on expectations and stereotypes. . . . Time pressures also limit the ability 
and motivation of both parties to avoid stereotype confirmation.”). 
 39. Jones, supra note 37, at 1768 (stating that “preexisting beliefs about the 
defendant’s social group may affect judgments of culpability and predictions of future 
criminal behavior, particularly if the crime is stereotypically linked to the defendant’s 
social group” and finding that jurors’ use of stereotypes resulted in more severe 
recommended sentences); see also Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 15, at 1007-08. 
 40. See Wang, supra note 38, at 1013. 
 41. Id. at 1014. 
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believe the out-group is pushy, ambitious, conniving, and in control of 
business, money, and industry (a typical accusation against Jews).”42 
N. Jeremi Duru argues that stereotypes about Black men are a 
part of the American tradition.43 He identifies a set of inter-related but 
unsubstantiated stereotypes as the myth of the Bestial Black Man, a 
myth “deeply imbedded in American culture, that black men are 
animalistic, sexually unrestrained, inherently criminal, and ultimately 
bent on rape.”44 Duru traces the origins of the myth to slavery.45 
Slaveholders justified the institution of slavery by perpetuating a 
belief that Black slaves were nonhuman.46 Additionally, Duru argues 
that slavery itself was the basis for the stereotype that Blacks are 
criminals because “the assertion of the most basic human right, liberty, 
was, for the slave, criminal.”47 Indeed, he notes that slaveholders lived 
in constant fear of slave rebellions and that this fear caused them to 
heavily scrutinize the actions of slaves.48 Duru theorizes that the 
stereotype concerning the super-sexuality of Black men also finds its 
origins in slavery.49 He notes that slaveholders feared the sexual 
potency of Black men and believed that Black men “would, whenever 
                                                   
 42. Lawrence, supra note 36, at 333 (citing studies). 
 43. See N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, The Scottsboro Boys, and 
the Myth of the Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1320 (2004). 
 44. Id.; accord Lawrence Vogelman, The Big Black Man Syndrome: The 
Rodney King Trial and the Use of Racial Stereotypes in the Courtroom, 20 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 571, 573 n.5 (1993) (“The unfortunate truth is that historically in our society, 
black men have been portrayed as a people to be feared; savages, unable to be 
tamed.”). 
 45. See Duru, supra note 43, at 1322. 
 46. See id. (discussing origins of the racist idea that black men are 
animalistic); see also Montré D. Carodine, “The Mis-Characterization of the Negro”: 
A Race Critique of the Prior Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 532 
(2009) (“[T]o justify their enslavement of Blacks and the harsher treatment of Blacks 
in the criminal justice system, White slave owners and legislators constructed a 
mischaracterization of Blacks using multiple negative stereotypes. Among other 
things, Blacks were characterized as being lazy, unclean, dishonest, ignorant, and 
violent. The common denominator with all of the stereotypes was that they reinforced 
the idea of the Black person as inferior to the White person.”). 
 47. Duru, supra note 43, at 1323; see also Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and 
Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 
367, 402-03 (1996) (describing the prevalence of the Black-as-criminal stereotype and 
stating that “[o]ne of the stereotypes most often applied to African American males is 
that they are more dangerous, more prone to violence, and more likely to be criminals 
or gang members than other members of society”). 
 48. See Duru, supra note 43, at 1323. 
 49. See id. at 1324. 
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possible, rape white women.”50 Duru argues that the myth of the 
Bestial Black Man survived the end of slavery and has continued to 
persevere in modern American life.51  
Stereotypes concerning the characteristics and behavior of Black 
women similarly date back to slavery and continue to persist today. 
Scholars have identified (and named) a set of stereotypes traditionally 
attributed to African–American women: 
First, Mammy, everyone’s favorite aunt or grandmother, sometimes 
referred to as “Aunt Jemima,” is ready to soothe everyone’s hurt, envelop 
them in her always ample bosom, and wipe away their tears. She is often 
even more nurturing to her white charges than to her own children. Next, 
there is Jezebel, the bad-black-girl, who is depicted as alluring and seductive 
as she either indiscriminately mesmerizes men and lures them into her bed, 
or very deliberately lures into her snares those who have something of value 
to offer her. Finally, Sapphire, the wise-cracking, balls-crushing, 
emasculating woman, is usually shown with her hands on her hips and her 
head thrown back as she lets everyone know she is in charge.52  
In addition to these commonly known stereotypes of Black women, 
scholars have identified two others that are at play in contemporary 
American society: (1) the “Matriarch,” described as “the mammy gone 
bad,” who spends too much time aware from the home, fails to 
properly supervise her children, emasculates the men in her life, and 
is overly aggressive;53 and (2) the “Welfare Queen,” a woman who 
refuses gainful employment and bears several children who are “a 
threat to [the country’s] economic stability.”54 These stereotypes 
contribute to a common perception that Black women are 
“untrustworthy, criminal, or dangerous.”55 
Although the focus of much of this Article is racial bias against 
African Americans, it is important to note that American society 
imposes stereotypes on other people of color and that the imposition 
of these stereotypes can impact their ability to receive a fair trial. 
Cynthia Lee identifies several commonly held stereotypes regarding 
                                                   
 50. Id. (noting that “[i]n the minds of many whites, the very existence of the 
black man in America, conceived to be animalistic, sexually predatory, and criminal 
by nature, presented a ubiquitous threat of rape”). 
 51. See id. at 1346. 
 52. Marilyn Yarbrough & Crystal Bennett, Cassandra and the “Sistahs”: 
The Peculiar Treatment of African American Women in the Myth of Women as Liars, 
3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 625, 635-36 (2000). 
 53. Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial 
Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman 
Syndrome, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1003, 1051 n.174.  
 54. Id. at 1051 n.175. 
 55. Lee, supra note 47, at 403. 
1252 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
Asian–American and Latino people, such as: (1) Asian as model 
minority stereotype, (2) Asian as foreigner stereotype, (3) Asian as 
martial artist stereotype, (4) Latino as foreigner stereotype, and (5) 
Latino as criminal stereotype.56 Lee notes that while the Asian as 
model minority stereotype may be beneficial to Asians, “the positive 
attributes of the model minority stereotype (e.g., intelligent, 
hardworking, law-abiding) are linked with corresponding negative 
attributes (e.g., lacking personality, unfairly competitive, clannish, 
unwilling to assimilate, rigidly rule-bound).”57 She argues that each of 
these stereotypes, including the model minority stereotype, can have 
a negative impact on jurors considering whether it was reasonable for 
a defendant to use deadly force against a person of color.58 In post-
9/11 America, Arab Americans have been stereotyped as disloyal and 
imminently threatening terrorists.59 As Ibrahim Hooper of the Council 
on American–Islamic Relations stated, “The common stereotypes are 
that we’re all Arabs, we’re all violent and we’re all conducting a holy 
war.”60  
Because racial and ethnic stereotypes are part and parcel of 
American culture, our justice system must do more to ensure that jury 
verdicts are not influenced by stereotyped beliefs. The rules of 
evidence should recognize the value that jurors are very likely to place 
on the race of a party or witness.61 Instead, they work in the opposite 
manner in that “they do not acknowledge the evidentiary value of race 
but at the same time often operate in a manner that perpetuates and 
increases the probative value and prejudicial effect of race.”62 
Racial bias, through the application of stereotypes, can have a 
very practical impact on the way in which jurors view and assess 
evidence at trial. This Part will highlight studies addressing the impact 
                                                   
 56. See id. at 423-52. 
 57. Id. at 426. 
 58. See id. at 499-500; accord JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND 
REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 3-4 (1997) 
(stating that a defendant in a self-defense case could argue that the victim’s race is 
relevant on the issue of reasonableness in that widely known racial stereotypes might 
influence a defendant’s belief that she is about to be attacked). 
 59. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American 
Redress and the “Racing” of Arab Americans as “Terrorists”, 8 ASIAN L.J. 1, 12 
(2001).  
 60. Id. Saito notes that even though Arabs come from many different 
religious backgrounds and many members of the Muslim faith are not Arab, “these 
distinctions are blurred and negative images about either Arabs or Muslims are often 
attributed to both.” Id. 
 61. See Carodine, supra note 46, at 536. 
 62. Id.  
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of stereotypes on the following types of evidence: (1) character 
assessment, (2) witness credibility assessment, and (3) fact 
interpretation and recall.  
A. Stereotypes and Character Assessment 
“I think he did it because he’s Mexican and Mexican men take 
whatever they want. . . . [N]ine times out of ten Mexican men [a]re 
guilty of being aggressive toward women and young girls.”63 
 
At trial, jurors are often called upon to assess character. While 
the Federal Rules of Evidence64 generally prohibit parties from 
introducing character evidence to show propensity,65 criminal 
defendants may introduce evidence of their own relevant character 
traits or the character traits of their alleged victim,66 and the 
government may respond with its own evidence in rebuttal.67 
Additionally, in homicide cases, the government may offer evidence 
of an alleged victim’s character for peacefulness to rebut defendant’s 
claim that the alleged victim was the first aggressor.68 The Federal 
Rules of Evidence provide parties with greater leeway if their purpose 
for introducing character evidence is something other than to show 
that an individual has a propensity to behave in a certain way.69 The 
Rules allow parties to civil and criminal actions to introduce evidence 
of a crime, wrong, or other act, often referred to as “prior bad acts” or 
“uncharged acts,” when offered for a purpose other than to show 
propensity.70 A proper purpose for such evidence might include 
                                                   
 63. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2017) (internal 
quotations omitted) (alleging that one juror made this statement during deliberations).  
 64. “Forty-two states, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the 
military” have adopted codes modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence. See JACK 
B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE T-1 (2d ed. 
2014).  
 65. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (“Evidence of a person’s character or character 
trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in 
accordance with the character or trait.”).  
 66. See id. at 404(a)(2). Criminal defendants may offer evidence of an alleged 
victim’s character traits subject to the limitations of the rape shield law. See id.  
 67. See id.  
 68. See id. at 404(a)(2)(C). 
 69. See id. at 405(a). 
 70. See id. at 404(b). 
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“proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”71  
The rules of evidence encourage trial courts to consider 
proffered character evidence with a heavy dose of skepticism, for, as 
the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee noted, placing 
character evidence before a jury is quite risky: 
Character evidence is of slight probative value and may be very prejudicial. 
It tends to distract the trier of fact from the main question of what actually 
happened on the particular occasion. It subtly permits the trier of fact to 
reward the good man [and] to punish the bad man because of their respective 
characters despite what the evidence in the case shows actually happened.72 
Despite the Advisory Committee’s efforts to implement a 
process that would force trial courts to properly scrutinize character 
evidence before it is introduced to the jury, prosecutors and defense 
attorneys routinely place covert, implicit race-based character 
evidence before juries.73 Because such evidence is subliminal, playing 
upon the jury’s most deep-seated prejudices, it escapes review from 
the trial court.74 
Historically, trial courts sanctioned prosecutors’ explicit 
attempts to introduce race-based character evidence as proof of a 
criminal defendant’s guilt.75 These explicit attempts to introduce race 
                                                   
 71. Id. at 404(b)(2). The Federal Rules of Evidence also allow parties to offer 
evidence proving a witness’s character for truthfulness; these rules will be discussed 
later. See infra Section I.B. 
 72. FED. R. EVID. 404 (quoting the advisory committee’s notes on proposed 
rules). 
 73. See Mikah K. Thompson, Blackness as Character Evidence, 20 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 321, 334-35 (2015) (theorizing that implicit bias, White-specific 
behavioral expectations for people of color, and long-held racial stereotypes combine 
to “create affirmative character evidence that jurors will consider in criminal cases 
involving African-Americans”); see also Carodine, supra note 46, at 530 (“Though 
the rules of evidence have adopted a general policy against the use of character 
evidence, they do not really account for or address the more subtle ways that character 
evidence is introduced to the jury. . . . A particularly difficult and troubling subset of 
this issue of informal character assessment by the jury is how jurors perceive the race 
of parties and other participants in the trial. Jurors, of course, come from the real world 
where race does matter.”). 
 74. See Thompson, supra note 73, at 335 (“This evidence of stereotypical 
Blackness is introduced to jurors outside the confines of Rule 404(a). Thus, courts are 
not required to engage in any analysis of whether the prejudice associated with the 
evidence, if any, might result in an unfair outcome.”). 
 75. See Duru, supra note 43, at 1331 (quoting Pumphrey v. State, 47 So. 156, 
158 (Ala. 1908), an Alabama Supreme Court case, which held that “social customs 
founded on race differences” and the fact that an alleged rape victim was White and 
the defendant Black could properly be considered when determining defendant’s 
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included arguments based on racial stereotypes.76 Duru describes a 
1919 Mississippi rape case involving a Black defendant where a 
prosecutor made the following statement during his closing argument: 
“Ah! It is nothing now days [sic] and not uncommon to pick up a paper 
and see where some brute has committed this crime. . . . You see it 
South, North, and East, where a brute of his race has committed this 
fiendish crime.”77 Although the defendant’s attorney objected to this 
statement, the trial court failed to make a ruling, and the jury later 
convicted the defendant.78  
In the modern era, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that 
race-based prosecutorial arguments violate the Constitution;79 
however, many reported cases detail the practice.80 Citing numerous 
federal cases published between 1968 and 2001, Demetria Frank has 
found that “prosecutors often make overt and improper racial 
references based on the victim or defendant’s race, likely triggering 
juror racial biases and stereotypes.”81 Frank notes that while appellate 
courts generally find this prosecutorial conduct to be improper, they 
rarely overturn the defendant’s conviction, often finding no prejudicial 
impact when the statement is balanced against the weight of the other 
evidence offered against the defendant.82 
                                                   
intent); accord Richardson v. State, 123 So. 283, 284 (Ala. Ct. App. 1929) (“What 
would be a caress or a mere assault as between persons of the same or similar social 
standing would become of much graver moment as between persons of a different 
social status and of different races.”); Jackson v. State, 18 S.E. 132, 133 (Ga. 1893) 
(“Surely it was legitimate for the jury to note any departure from the customary modes 
of visiting which was involved in a nocturnal entrance by a negro man into the 
bedroom of a white woman during the hours usually devoted to sleep.”).  
 76. See Duru, supra note 43, at 1332 (noting that, historically, attorneys’ 
comments often reinforced the stereotype of Black men as inherently criminal).  
 77. Id. (quoting Garner v. State, 83 So. 83, 83 (Miss. 1919)). 
 78. See id. The Mississippi Supreme Court overturned defendant’s 
conviction, finding that the prosecutor’s statement “appealed to racial prejudice and 
Southern sentiment” and may have had a strong impact on the jury. Garner, 83 So. at 
83-84.  
 79. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310 n.30 (1987) (“The 
Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial arguments.”) (citing Donnelly v. 
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).  
 80. See Demetria D. Frank, The Proof is in the Prejudice: Implicit Racial 
Bias, Uncharged Act Evidence & the Colorblind Courtroom, 32 HARV. J. RACIAL & 
ETHNIC JUST. 1, 24-25 n.139 (2016). 
 81. Id. at 24, 24-25 n.139. 
 82. See id. at 25. Frank also notes that the abuse of discretion standard of 
review allows the appellate court to overturn a trial court’s evidentiary ruling only 
where the ruling was “arbitrary and irrational.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Frank 
theorizes that appellate court judges are unlikely to make such a finding if they do not 
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In the 2013 case Calhoun v. United States, the Supreme Court 
had an opportunity to weigh in on a prosecutor’s inappropriate 
reference to race, but it failed to grant certiorari to the defendant who 
sought to have his conviction overturned because of the reference.83 In 
Calhoun, an African–American defendant was charged with 
participating in a drug conspiracy.84 Although Calhoun’s friend 
testified that Calhoun was aware of a plan to complete a drug 
transaction, Calhoun testified that he had no knowledge of his friend’s 
plan to purchase drugs.85 During Calhoun’s cross-examination, the 
prosecutor repeatedly questioned him regarding his intent.86 At one 
point during cross-examination, the prosecutor stated, “You’ve got 
African–Americans, you’ve got Hispanics, you’ve got a bag full of 
money. Does that tell you—a light bulb doesn’t go off in your head 
and say, This is a drug deal?”87 Defense counsel did not object to the 
question but addressed the prosecutor’s racial reference during closing 
arguments.88 During the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, he stated to 
the jury: 
I got accused by [defense counsel] of, I guess, racially, ethnically profiling 
people when I asked the question of Mr. Calhoun, Okay, you got African–
American[s] and Hispanics, do you think it’s a drug deal? But there’s one 
element that’s missing. The money. So what are they doing in this room 
with a bag full of money? What does your common sense tell you that these 
people are doing in a hotel room with a bag full of money, cash? None of 
these people are Bill Gates or computer [magnates]? None of them are real 
estate investors.89 
Although the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari on 
Calhoun’s petition, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer, 
published a statement that denounced the prosecutor’s race-based 
references.90 Sotomayor stated that the Court’s denial of Calhoun’s 
petition should not be read to indicate the Court’s tolerance for the 
prosecutor’s statements.91 She indicated that the prosecutor’s 
statements were obviously improper and at odds with Supreme Court 
                                                   
fully grasp that a prosecutor’s improper reference to race can trigger juror bias. See 
id.  
 83. See generally Calhoun v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1136 (2013). 
 84. See id. at 1136. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See id. 
 87. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 88. See id. at 1136, 1137 n.*. 
 89. Id. at 1137 n.* (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 90. See id. at 1136-37. 
 91. See id. at 1136. 
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precedent.92 According to Sotomayor, “By suggesting that race should 
play a role in establishing a defendant’s criminal intent, the prosecutor 
here tapped a deep and sorry vein of racial prejudice that has run 
through the history of criminal justice in our Nation.”93 Indeed, 
Sotomayor identified the prosecutor’s statements as an obvious 
attempt to convince jurors “to substitute racial stereotype for evidence, 
and racial prejudice for reason.”94  
While courts have addressed the government’s explicit attempts 
to introduce race-based character evidence to jurors, they have done 
little to eliminate implicit or subliminal race-based character evidence. 
Social science research has revealed that even the most basic racial 
cues during trial can trigger the application of stereotypes and impact 
how jurors assess the evidence before them.95 On the basis of this 
research, legal scholars have theorized that when attorneys reference 
animal imagery in describing people of color and Black men in 
particular, they trigger commonly held stereotypes and prejudices.96 
Thus, referring to people of color as “animals in the jungle,” “mad 
dogs,” or “laughing hyenas” might impact a juror’s assessment of a 
defendant’s character.97 Scholars have identified other “racial code 
words” that trigger stereotypes.98 Carodine argues that a prosecutor’s 
references to Black defendants as “they” or “them” signal to jurors 
that Blacks are inherently different from Whites and “generally 
outliers in the moral, civilized, and law-abiding society to which the 
jurors themselves belong.”99 Carodine cites State v. Henderson,100 a 
                                                   
 92. See id. at 1137. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin 
Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. 
REV. 307, 309-10 (2010). These researchers argue that stereotypes are activated 
“easily, automatically, and often unconsciously.” Id. at 327. 
 96. See Duru, supra note 43, at 1342. 
 97. Id.; see also Vogelman, supra note 44, at 573-74 (stating that trial 
attorneys often evoke stereotypes in order to “obtain an emotional response from the 
jurors”); id. at 577 (noting that the attorneys representing the police officers charged 
with assaulting Rodney King used very specific words to describe King in their effort 
to obtain acquittals for their clients; according to Vogelman, “[t]he defense, overtly 
and subliminally, portrayed Rodney King as a crazed savage on his way to do evil in 
the bedrooms of Simi Valley”). 
 98. Carodine, supra note 46, at 570 (internal quotations omitted).  
 99. Id. 
 100. See generally State v. Henderson, 620 N.W.2d 688 (Minn. 2001). 
1258 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
Minnesota case, as an example of a prosecutor’s attempt to “other”101 
the Black defense witnesses who testified before the jury.102 In 
Henderson, the prosecution argued to the jury, “[T]he people that are 
involved in this world are not people from your world. Their 
experiences, their lifestyles are totally foreign to all of you. These are 
not your world. These are the Defendant’s people. They are his 
friends.”103 On appeal, the defendant argued that this statement 
demonstrated the government’s attempt to appeal to the jury’s 
passions and prejudices, but the prosecution denied that the statement 
had anything to do with the race of the witnesses.104 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court found that the prosecutor’s statement did not constitute 
misconduct nor was the comment so prejudicial that it denied 
defendant his right to a fair trial.105 It is important to note that defense 
attorneys also utilize racial code words and specific imagery in self-
defense cases involving African Americans.106 
The subtle race-based references and imagery often introduced 
at trial are identical to the propensity evidence that courts routinely 
exclude pursuant to the rules of evidence. Just as propensity evidence 
might prime a jury to find that an individual acted in conformity with 
past behavior, race-coded language might prime a jury to find that an 
individual acted in conformity with widely known stereotypes about 
the individual’s racial or ethnic group. Despite the obvious similarities 
between these two types of character evidence, the rules of evidence 
are only equipped to address the former. 
B. Stereotypes and Witness Credibility Assessment 
I don’t believe defendant’s alibi witness. After all, he’s an 
illegal.107 
 
As a part of their fact-finding role, jurors must assess whether 
witnesses are providing truthful testimony. As the Supreme Court has 
noted, one of the jury’s core functions is to make credibility 
                                                   
 101. See infra text accompanying notes 126-27 (discussing the concept of 
“othering”). 
 102. Carodine, supra note 46, at 570-71. 
 103. Henderson, 620 N.W.2d at 702 (alteration in original). 
 104. See id. at 702-03. 
 105. See id. at 703. 
 106. See ARMOUR, supra note 58, at 4. 
 107. These sentences paraphrase a statement allegedly made by a juror during 
deliberations in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2017). 
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determinations—in essence operating as a lie detector.108 The justice 
system leaves this important function to the jury based on the 
presumption that jurors are “fitted for it by their natural intelligence 
and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of men.”109 
Recognizing the importance of the jury’s function as a “lie detector,” 
several rules of evidence focus on witness credibility and 
impeachment. Federal Rules of Evidence 607, 609, and 613 address 
the manner in which witnesses may be impeached,110 and Rule 608 
regulates the manner in which evidence concerning a witness’s 
character for truthfulness may be introduced to the jury.111  
Although jurors serve as the chief lie detectors during trial, 
studies demonstrate that jurors, like other people, are not very good at 
lie detection. According to Joseph Rand, who reviewed more than 
thirty years of research on lie detection, “most observers in controlled 
studies detect deception about as well as a flipped coin, because they 
focus on ‘cues’ to deception derived from folklore and common 
sense––such as the speaker’s inability to maintain a steady gaze––that 
are often more a sign of discomfort than deception.”112 Rand theorizes 
that jurors may be worse at lie detection than the subjects participating 
in the controlled studies because trial witnesses will likely be better 
prepared.113 Rand concludes that jurors “are likely to be regularly 
misled by [a] deceitful witness or mistakenly distrustful of the truthful 
one.”114 
Racial bias and stereotypes create even more risk that jurors will 
make mistakes in their efforts to assess witness credibility. Rand 
argues that a “[d]emeanor [g]ap” exists when jurors of one race are 
called upon to assess the credibility and demeanor of a witness of a 
different race.115 He posits that well-intentioned and low-prejudiced 
jurors “will be unable to dependably judge the demeanor of a witness 
of a different race because they are unable to accurately decipher the 
                                                   
 108. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312-13 (1998) (quoting 
United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
 109. Id. at 313 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891)). 
 110. See FED. R. EVID. 607, 609, 613 (covering the rules on “Who May 
Impeach a Witness,” “Impeachment by Evidence of a Criminal Conviction,” and 
“Witness’s Prior Statement”). 
 111. See id. at 608 (discussing the rule that covers “A Witness’s Character for 
Truthfulness or Untruthfulness”). 
 112. Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury, 
33 CONN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000). 
 113. See id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 4. 
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cues that the witness uses to communicate sincerity.”116 Before 
reviewing the specific ways in which racial bias and stereotypes can 
impact credibility assessment in the modern American courtroom, it 
is important to consider the historical relevance of race on the question 
of a witness’s credibility. 
Prior to the abolition of slavery, the law generally prohibited 
slaves from testifying against Whites.117 This prohibition was enforced 
in southern and northern states alike.118 Similarly, laws in states 
including New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia precluded free 
Blacks from testifying against Whites.119 Once the Civil War ended, 
Congress passed a law that forbade the state from depriving citizens 
of their right to file suit, act as parties to a suit, or provide evidence.120 
Even though this law ended the official exclusion of Black witnesses, 
for much of the twentieth century attorneys frequently argued that 
juries should discount or ignore the testimony of Black witnesses. As 
a part of her research on the topic of race and witness credibility, Sheri 
Lynn Johnson reviewed several pre-Civil Rights Era prosecutorial 
misconduct cases and found two patterns of racially biased attorney 
arguments concerning credibility.121 In the first pattern, attorneys 
argued that Black witnesses were inherently less trustworthy because 
of their race while the second pattern involved attorneys arguing that 
Black witnesses should not be believed because Blacks are inclined to 
lie for each other.122 Johnson also found a case where prosecutors made 
similar arguments about Chinese witnesses testifying on behalf of a 
Chinese–American defendant.123 Importantly, Johnson found that 
                                                   
 116. Id. Rand’s argument regarding the “demeanor gap” is very similar to the 
argument, backed by empirical evidence, that eyewitnesses of one race are more likely 
to make mistakes when identifying persons of a different race. See Am. Bar 
Ass’n, American Bar Association Policy 104D: Cross-Racial Identification, 37 SW. 
U. L. REV. 917, 918 (2008) (“Persons of one racial group may have greater difficulty 
distinguishing among individual faces of persons in another group than among faces 
of persons in [their] own group. Persons who primarily interact within their own racial 
group, especially if they are in the majority group, will better perceive and process the 
subtlety of facial features of persons within their own racial group than persons of 
other racial groups. In terms of personal experience, who has never heard the phrase, 
‘they all look alike to me’?”). 
 117. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of 
Credibility, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 261, 267 (1996). 
 118. See id.  
 119. See id.  
 120. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866). 
 121. See Johnson, supra note 117, at 274. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. 
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these patterns have continued, and she cites to several modern cases 
where prosecutors have explicitly argued that a witness’s race should 
impact the jury’s assessment of his or her credibility.124 These reported 
cases have led Johnson to conclude that race continues to serve as a 
proxy for credibility.125 
To the extent race impacts credibility assessments, it often 
occurs in more subtle, subconscious ways. Indeed, well-intentioned 
jurors may be completely unaware that stereotypes and bias are at play 
as they judge the truthfulness of trial witnesses.126 Many prosecutors 
have abandoned explicit race-based credibility arguments in light of 
appellate courts’ disfavor for such arguments,127 but they have 
replaced them with indirect jibes that chip away at the witness’s 
credibility. Johnson notes that prosecutors use an array of tactics, 
including “racial epithets, animal imagery, and the practice of 
referring to a minority race witness by her first name,” thereby 
triggering multiple racial stereotypes.128 
Researchers have identified specific stereotypes that likely come 
into play when African Americans serve as witnesses. They include:  
 
(1)  The stereotype that African Americans are less intelligent 
than Whites, which would be invoked if the Black 
witnesses were called upon to recall and describe events 
accurately;  
(2)  The stereotype that African Americans are not 
trustworthy and honest, which would have obvious 
implications for any sort of trial testimony; and  
                                                   
 124. See id. at 305-06 (describing a modern case where prosecutors argued 
that an African–American prosecution witness should be believed because he or she 
was testifying against another African American, as well as a case where a prosecutor 
argued that a White male witness was credible because his testimony included an 
admission about having sex with a Black woman, and “[i]f he is going to lie about 
anything else, he wouldn’t admit having intercourse with a black woman”). 
 125. See id. at 269. 
 126. See id. at 265 (stating that “racially biased assessments of credibility may 
occur in the absence of overt—or even covert—racial animosity”); see also Rand, 
supra note 112, at 43 (citing to research establishing that White jurors who do not 
actually believe in racial stereotypes will still be influenced by them). 
 127. See Johnson, supra note 117, at 321 (“Modern courts have universally 
concluded that arguments that one race is more credible than another and arguments 
that members of one race are likely to lie for one another are racially inflammatory 
and therefore impermissible. Courts have also deemed impermissible arguments that 
an accusation is especially credible because the accuser, like the defendant, is 
Black.”). 
 128. Id. at 307. 
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(3)  The stereotype that African Americans are violent, such 
that any allegation regarding violence would be bolstered 
by its consistency with the stereotype.129  
 
These stereotypes impact jurors in various ways. Rand describes 
the first such phenomenon as “skepticism bias.”130 According to Rand, 
jurors tend to be less suspicious and are willing to give the benefit of 
the doubt to witnesses who share their identity, but they are more 
suspicious of witnesses who do not share their identity.131 White jurors 
in particular begin the credibility assessment process with an “innate 
suspicion” of Black witnesses.132 Even Whites who have low levels of 
prejudice may see facts in a particular way because racial stereotypes 
have a strong, albeit subconscious, influence on how they perceive 
events.133 Rand has found that jurors who are more influenced by racial 
stereotypes are likely to be more suspicious of African–American 
witnesses.134 This higher level of skepticism will cause jurors to “focus 
more closely on certain deception cues and become more skeptical. 
They will skew their credibility determinations against not only 
deceptive African American witnesses, but honest ones as well.”135  
Racial stereotypes also have greater influence over jurors when 
they hear stereotype-consistent testimony because individuals who are 
impacted by stereotypes do a better job of processing stereotype-
consistent information as compared to stereotype-inconsistent 
information.136 As Johnson explains, “To the extent that a witness––of 
any race––testifies to behavior that conforms to a racial stereotype of 
the purported actor, such conformity may enhance that witness’s 
credibility.”137 Johnson notes that stereotypes concerning violence or 
sexual behavior are particularly corroborative of a witness’s 
                                                   
 129. Rand, supra note 112, at 42; accord Johnson, supra note 117, at 316 
(stating that stereotypes about the intelligence of African Americans as well as 
stereotypes about Black criminality and dishonesty could subconsciously affect a 
juror’s credibility determinations). The research in the area is heavily focused on the 
Black-White binary. Much more research is needed regarding other people of color 
and what impact their race may have on a jury’s lie detection capabilities.  
 130. See Rand, supra note 112, at 41. 
 131. See id. at 44. 
 132. Id. at 41. 
 133. See id. at 44. 
 134. Id. at 45. 
 135. Id.  
 136. See Johnson, supra note 117, at 315. 
 137. Id. at 317. 
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testimony.138 Thus, a racial stereotype regarding the sexual proclivities 
or super-sexuality of Black men might work to corroborate the 
testimony of a White woman who says a Black man raped her. Rand 
has found that the opposite is true as well––where witness testimony 
is stereotype-inconsistent, jurors who are impacted by racial 
stereotypes will find this testimony to be less credible. He posits that 
individuals will ignore information that is inconsistent with their 
expectations.139 Therefore, “if a white juror has developed a [belief] 
that African–American men act a certain way, she will more easily 
process information that is consistent with that stereotype, and 
disregard information that is inconsistent.”140 
Racial stereotypes also assist counsel in indirectly discrediting a 
witness by identifying the witness as the “other.” “Othering” is 
defined as “a process by which individuals and society view and label 
people who are different in a way that devalues them.”141 When 
individuals engage in “othering,” they “determine that certain people 
are not us, and that determination functions to create . . . a devalued 
and dehumanized Other, and a distancing of the other from 
ourselves.”142 Scholars theorize that lawyers who can successfully 
“other” a witness will be able to hurt the witness’s credibility. 
Carodine argues that Federal Rule of Evidence 609, which allows for 
the admission of prior criminal convictions to impeach the testimony 
of a witness,143 is especially harmful to Black defendant–witnesses 
because it reinforces the widely known Blacks-as-criminals stereotype 
                                                   
 138. Id. 
 139. See Rand, supra note 112, at 41 (“People design strategies for simplifying 
the world by categorizing information according to schemas that help explain and 
anticipate new information.”). While schemas allow us to process information more 
quickly, they also allow for errors where information does not fit into our preset 
patterns. See id. 
 140. Id. (describing how jurors who engage in this practice may not be 
motivated by racial animus but instead by an adaptive cognitive process).  
 141. Susan J. Stabile, Othering and the Law, 12 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 381, 382 
(2016). 
 142. Id. at 382-83 (internal quotations omitted). While the application of 
stereotypes can assist an individual in “othering” another person or group of people, 
othering and stereotyping are not identical: “Stereotyping involves making judgments 
about a person based on perceived characteristics of the particular group to which the 
person belongs rather than on an individual assessment of the person,” while othering 
is a more broad judgment that the individual or group in question is “not me” or “not 
us.” Id. at 383. Although stereotyping and othering may happen subconsciously, 
stereotyping, unlike othering, “does not necessarily carry a judgment that the ‘other’ 
is less than oneself.” Id.  
 143. See generally FED. R. EVID. 609. 
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and allows for the “othering” of the defendant–witness.144 She argues 
that a prosecutor can “other” the defendant–witness with a prior 
conviction by “draw[ing] a line around the defendant, locating both 
herself and her audience on the same opposite of that line––thereby 
defining the attorney as a trustworthy member of the jurors’ 
community.”145  
The State of Florida v. Zimmerman trial offers a helpful example 
of an attorney’s attempt to “other” a witness using racial stereotypes. 
Zimmerman was charged with second-degree murder in the killing of 
a seventeen-year-old Black male named Trayvon Martin.146 
Zimmerman claimed that he killed Martin in self-defense.147 The 
prosecution’s key witness was a nineteen-year-old Black woman 
named Rachel Jeantel.148 Jeantel was Martin’s friend and the last 
person to speak with him before his death.149 Jeantel provided key 
testimony for the prosecution despite her reluctance to testify, but 
some commentators perceived defense counsel’s cross-examination of 
Jeantel to be “abusive” because the attorney’s tone was harsh and “the 
questioning at times, subtly (or not so subtly, depending on your 
viewpoint) implied that Ms. Jeantel was unintelligent and thus not 
credible.”150 Jeantel also struggled to read the transcript of her 
deposition testimony, which defense counsel provided to her during 
cross-examination, and she later admitted that she had some literacy 
                                                   
 144. See Carodine, supra note 46, at 542 (arguing that prior criminal 
convictions lack probative value on the issue of truthfulness and are terribly 
prejudicial to defendant-witnesses in that jurors are very likely to use the prior 
conviction for an impermissible purpose). Further, prior criminal convictions are not 
predictive of who will likely lie under oath. “If jurors hear that the accused was 
previously convicted of a crime, even if the crime was completely unrelated to the 
current charges against the defendant, there is a substantial likelihood, indeed a 
substantial probability, that the jury will convict the defendant for being a ‘bad’ person 
generally.” Id. at 541-42. 
 145. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Accord Andrew Elliot Carpenter, 
Chambers v. Mississippi: The Hearsay Rule and Racial Evaluations of Credibility, 8 
WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 15, 22 (2002) (“Lawyers may try to connect 
with the jurors based on race, subtly reinforcing the idea that the minority witness is 
part of the ‘other,’ and so should not be trusted.”). 
 146. See generally Thompson, supra note 73, at 335-43 (detailing the facts 
leading up to the Zimmerman trial as well as an analysis of the impact that racial 
stereotypes had on the outcome). 
 147. Id. at 335. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 337. 
 150. Montré D. Carodine, Contemporary Issues in Critical Race Theory: The 
Implications of Race as Character Evidence in Recent High-Profile Cases, 75 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 679, 688 (2014).  
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difficulties.151 Jeantel’s testimony, like the entire Zimmerman trial, 
was televised, and social media reacted swiftly with criticism of 
Jeantel for being stereotypically Black––uneducated, hostile, 
inarticulate, angry toward Whites, lazy, and a thug.152 Thus, 
Zimmerman’s defense counsel was successful in “othering” Jeantel. 
As Carodine stated, “The message that Zimmerman’s lawyer, Don 
West, sent the court, the jury, and the (white) public was that ‘she 
looked different, sounded different, shit she must be lying because she 
sure as hell ain’t one of us.’”153 
Finally, racial stereotypes impact witness credibility where a 
party offers cross-racial corroborative testimony. This phenomenon is 
a corollary to the stereotype that people of color are willing to lie for 
each other. Where a party offers corroborating testimony from an 
individual of a different race, well-intentioned fact-finders may 
automatically determine that witness’s testimony to be more credible. 
The Supreme Court fell victim to this phenomenon in Schlup v. 
Delo.154 Schlup, a White man who was sentenced to death following a 
murder conviction, filed a federal habeas corpus petition, alleging that 
his constitutional rights were violated when certain evidence that 
would have proven his innocence was withheld from the jury.155 At the 
time of the murder, Schlup was an inmate in a Missouri penitentiary, 
and he and two other inmates were charged with killing a Black 
inmate.156 While the Supreme Court spent much of its time considering 
the appropriate standard of review, Justice Stevens, writing for the 
majority, referenced some of the affidavits submitted by Schlup to 
establish his innocence.157 The Court specifically quoted the affidavit 
of Lamont Griffin Bey and identified Bey as Black.158 Bey’s affidavit 
stated that Schlup was not involved in the murder.159 Sheri Lynn 
Johnson argues that Stevens quoted Bey’s affidavit because he found 
Bey to be especially credible due to his race:160  
The Court may be implying that any time a Black person testifies for a white 
person, that testimony is more likely to be true. If so, then more likely than 
what? More likely than if a Black person testifies for a Black person? More 
                                                   
 151. See Thompson, supra note 73, at 338. 
 152. See id.  
 153. See Carodine, supra note 150, at 688. 
 154. See generally Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). 
 155. See id. at 301. 
 156. See id. at 301-02. 
 157. See id. at 308 n.18. 
 158. See id. 
 159. See id. 
 160. See Johnson, supra note 117, at 311. 
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likely than if a white person testifies for a white person? Perhaps the 
inference is narrower: when a Black prisoner testifies for a white prisoner, 
that testimony is more likely to be true. If so, again, more likely than 
what?161 
If highly intelligent, well-trained jurists can fall prey to the stereotype 
that cross-racial corroborating testimony is more credible than intra-
racial corroborating testimony, then jurors are very likely to buy into 
the same stereotype.  
This Section has highlighted the various ways in which racial 
stereotypes can impact a jury’s assessment of witness credibility often 
outside an individual juror’s conscious awareness. What is missing 
from this discussion is a description of the tools available to address 
the problem. Because the phenomena described above are quite 
different from the explicit race-based credibility arguments of the past, 
our justice system is not equipped to address them. As Johnson notes:  
The information that we have about racial stereotypes and about modern 
forms and manifestations of prejudice suggests that the silent––and 
sometimes even subconscious––inferences of jurors will often be tainted 
racial generalizations, yet the influence of such inferences on jurors is not 
subject to challenge through any existing legal mechanism.162  
C. Stereotypes, Fact Interpretation, and Recall 
As fact-finders, jurors must go about interpreting the facts put 
before them, a task that is heavily influenced by each juror’s life 
experiences.163 Lee has found that “decision-makers actively construct 
representations of the trial evidence based on their prior expectations 
about what constitutes an adequate explanation of the litigated 
event. . . . These representations, rather than the original ‘raw’ 
evidence, form the basis of the juror’s final decision.”164 The justice 
system encourages jurors to rely upon their personal experiences when 
weighing evidence and interpreting facts.165 Moreover, the system 
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acknowledges that allowing jurors to enter the deliberation room with 
their unique life experiences makes the fact-finding process both 
human and imperfect.166 As the New York Court of Appeals has 
described, jurors bring very valuable experiences to the process: “Nor 
would we want a jury devoid of life experience, even if that were 
possible, because it is precisely such experience that enables a jury to 
evaluate the credibility of witnesses and the strength of arguments.”167  
While I agree that jurors’ individual life experiences certainly 
provide them with helpful insight at times, I am troubled by the 
possibility that one’s life experiences and understanding of the world 
may include some racial and ethnic stereotypes. This Section will 
explore two distinct but related areas where the jury’s fact-finding 
function can be influenced by racial bias and stereotypes: the 
interpretation of ambiguous facts and fact recall.  
1. Ambiguous Facts 
At the outset, it is important to explain what I mean by 
“ambiguous facts.” A fact scenario is ambiguous when the 
participants’ intentions are not obvious, and their actions can be 
interpreted in multiple, divergent ways. Legal scholars have argued 
that where holes exist in the prosecution’s case, jurors tend to fill in 
the gaps or “complete the story” by turning to racial stereotypes.168 In 
fact, where the prosecution’s case is especially weak, jurors are more 
likely to rely on their life experiences, including their racial biases, to 
make their decisions.169 Jurors’ inclination to interpret ambiguous 
behavior in this manner results from “the general tendency of 
observers to interpret the ambiguous behavior of another person in 
accordance with the observer’s expectations.”170  
Legal scholars can find support for their arguments in the social 
science literature.171 In one study, Patricia Devine presented a set of 
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ambiguous facts to participants after priming them with stereotypes of 
African Americans.172 She quickly flashed words to study participants, 
including “poor,” “athletic,” and “Black,” and then asked them to read 
a story about a Black person who “demands his money back from a 
store clerk immediately after a purchase and refuses to pay his rent 
until his apartment is repainted.”173 Once the participants completed 
the story, Devine asked them to make judgments about the person.174 
She found that the priming had a direct impact on the participants’ 
judgments.175 Participants who were primed with more stereotypes 
judged the person’s ambiguous behavior more harshly than 
participants who were primed with fewer stereotypes.176 The study 
demonstrated that subliminal priming “affected the way participants 
later judged the hostility of African Americans in racially stereotyped 
ways.”177 Other researchers have found that the Blacks-as-criminals 
stereotype caused study participants to see weapons where none 
actually existed and to classify identical facial expressions as more 
hostile or threatening on Black faces as compared to White faces.178  
In the 1970s, Birt Duncan conducted a study to test his theory 
that study subjects would interpret ambiguously hostile behavior 
differently based on the race of the actor.179 The participants, who were 
all White, observed a scenario where two people, either Black or 
White, got into a heated argument that resulted in Actor A shoving 
Actor B.180 Participants were asked to rate the behavior of Actor A.181 
Duncan found that the participants judged Actor A much more harshly 
depending on his race: 
White university subjects perceived the “somewhat ambiguous,” certainly 
less than blatant shove as violent (and labeled it thusly) for all conditions in 
which the black was the harm-doer, to a greater extent when the victim is 
white, but also when the victim was another black. Aggressive behavior, 
dramatizing, playing around, and so on (any category but violent behavior) 
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were the labels applied when the harm-doer was white, even if the victim 
was a black or another white. Support was found for the hypothesis that the 
threshold for labeling an act as violent is lower when viewing a black 
committing the same act.182 
Duncan concluded that his findings could have real-world 
consequences for Blacks who have been accused of violence and 
whose fate could be decided by eyewitness testimony.183 
In a more recent study, Laurie Rudman and Matthew Lee tested 
whether violent, misogynistic rap lyrics would have an impact on 
study participants’ assessments of Black and White actors.184 Study 
subjects, who were told they were participating in a marketing study, 
listened to rap music for the first part of the study.185 Researchers 
caused the audio player to stop working during the sixth rap song.186 
Participants were then told that the study had been discontinued due 
to the player’s malfunction but that they could satisfy their obligation 
to participate in a study by completing a questionnaire on “person 
perception.”187 Study subjects then read a story about a man engaging 
in ambiguously sexist behavior such as refusing to tip a female server 
or refusing to let a female door-to-door salesperson inside his house.188 
In half of the stories, the man’s name was Donald and in the other half 
the man’s name was Kareem.189 Rudman and Lee theorized that the 
participants would assume Donald to be White and Kareem to be 
Black.190 Participants were asked to rate the man’s level of hostility, 
sexism, and intelligence.191 Rudman and Lee found that subjects who 
were primed with rap music were more likely to judge Kareem as more 
hostile, more sexist, and less intelligent than Donald and that these 
judgments did not correlate with the participants’ prejudice levels.192 
The researchers’ finding regarding prejudice levels suggests that even 
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low-prejudiced and non-prejudiced individuals “may succumb to the 
influence of implicit stereotypes and prejudice when they interpret and 
judge social behavior.”193 Moreover, if jurors’ racial stereotypes are 
triggered, perhaps even en route to the courthouse,194 then African–
American defendants could suffer the consequences. 
Finally, in a study conducted by Justin Levinson and Danielle 
Young, participants read a one-paragraph description of an armed 
robbery and then viewed five photographs of the crime and crime 
scene.195 One of the photos showed an armed gunman who was 
wearing a mask but whose forearms were exposed.196 The skin tone of 
the gunman was manipulated, with some participants viewing a photo 
of a dark-skinned gunman while others viewed a photo of a lighter-
skinned gunman.197 The photos were identical other than the difference 
in skin tone.198 The participants then evaluated twenty pieces of 
evidence.199 Some of the evidence suggested that the defendant 
charged in the case may be innocent (e.g., the defendant had a used 
movie ticket stub for a show that started twenty minutes before the 
robbery occurred), while other evidence suggested that defendant was 
guilty (e.g., the store owner identified defendant’s voice in an audio 
line-up).200 The participants also reviewed some ambiguous evidence 
(e.g., defendant was seen shopping at the store two days prior to the 
robbery).201 After evaluating the evidence, participants were asked to 
determine whether the defendant was guilty or not guilty on a 100-
point scale.202 Levinson and Young found that the skin tone of the 
defendant “significantly affected” the evidence judgments.203 They 
determined that “[p]articipants who saw the photo of the perpetrator 
with a dark skin tone judged ambiguous evidence to be significantly 
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more indicative of guilt than participants who saw the photo of a 
perpetrator with a lighter skin tone.”204 Additionally, the study subjects 
who saw a darker-skinned perpetrator judged the defendant to be more 
guilty on the 100-point scale than study subjects who saw a lighter-
skinned perpetrator.205 Levinson and Young concluded that simply 
showing study subjects a photo of a darker-skinner perpetrator 
triggered racial bias that could impact a jury’s evaluation of 
ambiguous trial evidence as well as jurors’ decisions concerning guilt 
or innocence.206 They also determined that racial stereotypes activated 
by the photo likely operated outside the participants’ awareness.207 
2. Fact Recall 
During deliberations, jurors will be called upon to discuss the 
facts they have learned. Even the most well-intentioned jurors are 
likely to experience some routine memory errors. These errors fall into 
two categories: forgotten information and distorted recollections or 
false memories.208 While memory errors are normal, they are also 
“predictable” and “meaningful.”209 A review of relevant research 
offers some insight into the predictability and meaningfulness of 
memory errors where racial stereotypes are at play. 
Just as jurors sometimes fill gaps in the prosecution’s case with 
stereotyped fact interpretations, they also tend to fill their own 
memory gaps with stereotypes.210 In particular, stereotype consistency 
plays a significant role in an individual’s ability to recall 
information.211 Researchers have found that people have less trouble 
recalling stereotype-consistent information as compared to stereotype-
inconsistent information.212 Thus, jurors in a criminal case may have 
an easier time remembering a Black defendant’s prior conviction for 
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a violent crime.213 Levinson references a study where participants were 
given scenarios about two stereotypically White crimes (identity fraud 
and ecstasy usage), two stereotypically Black crimes (crack cocaine 
usage and shoplifting), and two stereotypically neutral crimes 
(marijuana usage and joyriding).214 The researchers manipulated the 
race of the perpetrator in the scenarios.215 After reviewing the stories, 
participants were asked to recall information about the scenarios and 
match the race of the perpetrator with each crime.216 The researchers 
found that participants had an easier time recalling the race of the 
perpetrator when the crime matched the stereotypes associated with 
the perpetrator’s racial identity.217 The results showed that “racial 
stereotypes can systematically affect jurors’ (implicit) recollections in 
the legal setting, and that jurors may exhibit better recall of 
information about stereotypical criminals and crimes.”218  
Stereotypes not only affect the facts that jurors recall, but they 
also play a role in the development of false memories.219 Again, 
stereotype consistency is a major factor: “Memory scholars have 
explained that people are more likely to generate false memories when 
the contents of these memories are consistent with stereotypes they 
have about the subject, actor, and situation of the memory.”220 In the 
context of eyewitness identification, the Blacks-as-criminals 
stereotype causes White witnesses to expect Black criminality, and 
this expectation is so strong that “whites may observe an interracial 
scene in which a white person is the aggressor, yet remember the black 
person as the aggressor.”221  
Levinson conducted a study to test his hypothesis that racial 
stereotypes can cause individuals to make memory errors.222 Study 
participants were presented with two unrelated stories.223 One story 
described a fistfight and the other described an employee’s 
termination.224 The protagonist in each story was White, African 
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American, or Hawaiian.225 After the participants finished their review 
of the stories, they completed a questionnaire that was unrelated to the 
stories.226 The questionnaire was intended to eliminate any immediate 
memories of the stories.227 After finishing the questionnaire, study 
participants answered questions about the stories.228 The questions 
required study subjects to recall aggressive facts, mitigating facts, and 
neutral facts from the stories.229 The questionnaire also asked 
participants about facts that were not actually included in the stories.230 
Levinson found that participants misremembered certain facts in 
racially biased ways.231 In relation to the fistfight story, he found that 
participants had an easier time recalling aggressive facts when the 
protagonist was African American as compared to the White 
protagonist.232 He also found that participants were more likely to 
recall false memories of aggressive action taken by the African–
American and Hawaiian protagonists even though the story did not 
include these facts.233 Levinson concluded that implicit memory biases 
have a tangible impact on jurors’ decision-making.234 
Before turning away from the topic of memory errors, it is 
important to consider whether the deliberation process works to solve 
the problems associated with forgotten facts and false memories. One 
might argue that the putting jurors into a room at the end of trial and 
allowing them to discuss the facts will cure any memory errors an 
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individual juror might experience as a result of racial stereotypes.235 
While the deliberation process would likely correct some memory 
errors, the effectiveness of process may depend on the jury’s 
motivations. Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie have identified two 
styles of juries: evidence-driven juries and verdict-driven juries.236 
Evidence-driven juries make an effort to come to agreement about the 
facts of the case while verdict-driven juries move directly to a 
discussion of the verdict.237 Pennington and Hastie theorize that 
evidence-driven juries have a greater opportunity to correct memory 
errors because they actually engage in a discussion of the facts.238 
Because verdict-driven juries move directly to the verdict stage, they 
are unlikely to identify and correct memory errors.239 Other studies 
have shown that even evidence-driven juries are not particularly 
effective at correcting memory errors.240 These researchers have 
concluded that there is very little support for the assumption that 
deliberation improves memory.241 Indeed, several studies have found 
that “the best predictor of post deliberation verdicts is individual 
jurors’ pre-deliberation verdicts.”242  
This Part has described the various ways in which racial 
stereotypes can affect jurors’ assessments of trial evidence, including 
character assessment, credibility assessment, and fact interpretation 
and recall. The impact of racial stereotypes is often automatic and 
subtle, and it may be quite difficult to correct the errors that will result. 
Because of the significant harm associated with the application of 
racial stereotypes, it is imperative that the justice system protect 
against racial bias utilizing what George Fisher has deemed front-end 
quality control.243 I will now turn to a review of the safeguards, as 
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identified by the Supreme Court, that exist to protect parties, and 
criminal defendants in particular, from racial prejudice that is “odious 
in all aspects . . . [and] especially pernicious in the administration of 
justice.”244 
II. CURRENT METHODS FOR IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING RACIAL 
BIAS AMONG JURORS 
In early 2017, the Supreme Court reaffirmed previously 
recognized methods for identifying racially biased jurors and added a 
new one. In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, two teenage sisters accused 
the defendant of sexual assault.245 The state charged the defendant with 
harassment, unlawful sexual contact, and attempted sexual assault of 
a child.246 Prior to the start of the trial, prospective jurors were asked 
if they believed they could be fair and impartial in the case. 
Additionally, they were provided with a written questionnaire, which 
asked if there was “anything about you that you feel would make it 
difficult for you to be a fair juror.”247 The trial judge and defense 
counsel asked the prospective jurors whether they could be fair and 
impartial, and the court encouraged jurors to request a private meeting 
if they had any concerns about their impartiality.248 None of the jurors 
expressed concerns or reported that they could not be fair and 
impartial, and no jurors mentioned that racial bias might impact 
them.249 After a three-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty of 
harassment and unlawful sexual contact, but it did not reach a verdict 
on the charge of attempted sexual assault.250 
After the trial court discharged the jury, defendant’s counsel met 
with the jurors to discuss the trial with them. Once the meeting was 
over, two jurors remained in the room to speak privately with 
defendant’s counsel.251 The two jurors reported that, during 
deliberations, another juror had expressed anti-Hispanic bias toward 
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defendant and his alibi witness.252 With the trial court’s permission, 
defendant’s counsel obtained sworn affidavits from the two jurors. 
They stated that the juror, identified as Juror H.C., told other jurors 
that he “believed the defendant was guilty because, in [H.C.’s] 
experience as an ex-law enforcement officer, Mexican men had a 
bravado that caused them to believe they could do whatever they 
wanted with women.”253 The jurors also reported that Juror H.C. 
stated, “I think he did it because he’s Mexican and Mexican men take 
whatever they want,” and that, in his experience, “nine times out of 
ten Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and 
young girls.”254 The jurors also attested that Juror H.C. said that he did 
not believe defendant’s alibi witness because he was “an illegal.”255 
Based on the jurors’ affidavits, defendant moved for a new trial. 
The trial court denied defendant’s motion, finding that Colorado Rule 
of Evidence 606(b) prohibited the jurors from testifying regarding the 
statements that Juror H.C. made during deliberations.256 Like Federal 
Rule of Evidence 606(b), Colorado Rule 606(b) limits juror testimony 
to the following matters: “(1) whether extraneous prejudicial 
information was improperly brought to the jurors’ attention, (2) 
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon 
any juror, or (3) whether there was a mistake in entering the verdict 
onto the verdict form.”257 The trial court reasoned that the two jurors’ 
affidavits failed to satisfy any of these exceptions. The Colorado Court 
of Appeals and Colorado Supreme Court affirmed.258 The United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether evidence of 
racial bias should qualify as an additional exception to Rule 606(b)’s 
no-impeachment rule.259 
The Court began its analysis by discussing the origins of the no-
impeachment rule;260 however, for purposes of this Article, the most 
relevant portion of the opinion is the Court’s discussion of the five 
safeguards that are currently in place to protect against racially biased 
jury verdicts: (1) voir dire regarding racial bias; (2) jury instructions 
on racial bias; (3) observation of juror demeanor and conduct showing 
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racial bias; (4) juror reports of racially biased comments or conduct 
during trial and prior to the start of deliberations; and (5) non-juror 
reports of racially biased comments or conduct after trial.261 The Court 
reviewed these safeguards in an effort to determine whether they 
adequately protect a defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury, 
which the Court has recognized as a constitutional guarantee for both 
criminal and civil litigants.262 Ultimately, the Court would determine 
that the Constitution requires the addition of a sixth safeguard––
namely, an additional exception to Rule 606(b)’s no-impeachment 
rule that allows trial courts to consider juror reports of racially biased 
comments or conduct after trial.263 
This Part will focus on voir dire and jury instructions, the two 
preemptive safeguards identified by the Court.264 Despite the Court’s 
suggestion that these tools are widely available, an exploration of the 
relevant case law reveals that federal and state courts disfavor the use 
of voir dire and jury instructions to ferret out racial bias and that, when 
these tools are used, they are often ineffective. 
A. Voir Dire Regarding Racial Bias 
The Court has long recognized voir dire as an effective method 
for protecting the right to an impartial jury.265 In its 1895 opinion 
Connors v. United States, the Court stated that the questioning of 
prospective jurors “is permissible in order to ascertain whether the 
juror has any bias, opinion, or prejudice that would affect or control 
the fair determination by him of the issues to be tried.”266 Several of 
the Court’s opinions have explored whether it is permissible to 
question prospective jurors regarding potential racial bias, and a 
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review of those opinions reveals that voir dire is not always available 
to parties concerned about potential racial bias among jurors. 
In the 1931 case Aldridge v. United States,267 the defendant, a 
Black man, was accused of murdering a White police officer and tried 
in federal district court.268 During voir dire, the defendant’s attorney 
approached the bench and requested that the trial judge question the 
prospective jurors, who were all White, regarding potential racial 
prejudice.269 Defendant’s attorney indicated that he believed the 
question to be necessary because during the defendant’s first trial on 
the murder charge, one juror indicated that she was influenced by the 
fact that the defendant was Black and the victim White.270 The trial 
judge refused to ask any questions related to potential racial bias or 
prejudice, and ultimately the defendant was convicted.271 The Court 
found that the trial court erred when it refused to question potential 
jurors regarding racial prejudice.272 After noting that several state 
courts had already recognized the propriety of such questions with 
respect to religion and race, the Court ruled that it would be a gross 
injustice to allow an individual to sit on a jury if his prejudice would 
prevent him from rendering a fair verdict.273 Although the Court 
acknowledged the government’s argument that allowing voir dire 
regarding racial bias would be disruptive to the court system, it stated 
that “it would be far more injurious to permit it to be thought that 
persons entertaining a disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve 
as jurors and that inquiries designed to elicit the fact of disqualification 
were barred.”274  
The Court addressed the constitutionality of a trial court’s 
refusal to allow voir dire concerning racial bias in Ham v. South 
Carolina.275 In Ham, the state charged a Black civil rights activist with 
possession of marijuana.276 At trial, defendant requested that the judge 
conduct voir dire related to the potential jurors’ racial bias against 
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Blacks.277 The trial court refused to ask these questions.278 The jury 
convicted the defendant, and the trial court sentenced him to eighteen 
months’ confinement.279 On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial 
court’s refusal to ask the racial bias questions resulted in a violation 
of his constitutional rights, and the Supreme Court agreed.280 First, the 
Court distinguished Aldridge because it addressed voir dire inquiry in 
the federal court system rather than the state court system.281 In 
Aldridge, the Court relied on its supervisory authority over the federal 
courts, rather than the Constitution, in finding that the trial court 
should have conducted voir dire inquiry regarding racial bias.282 In 
spite of this distinction, the Ham Court found that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause required the trial court to make an 
inquiry concerning racial bias once the defendant raised the issue.283 
The Court noted that the trial court maintains discretion as to the form 
and number of the questions.284 While the holdings of Aldridge and 
Ham appear to answer the question of whether voir dire inquiry 
regarding racial bias is not only permissible but required pursuant to 
the Constitution, the Court would narrow the applicability of these 
rulings over the next several years.285  
About three years after its decision in Ham, the Court limited the 
applicability of voir dire inquiry concerning racial bias in Ristaino v. 
Ross.286 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts charged James Ross, 
Jr. and two other African Americans with armed robbery, assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and assault and battery with 
intent to murder.287 The victim of Ross’ alleged crimes was a White 
security guard employed by Boston University.288 During voir dire, all 
three defendants requested that the trial judge ask potential jurors 
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about racial prejudice as well as their affiliations with law enforcement 
agencies.289 When the judge inquired about why such questions were 
necessary, counsel for one of Ross’ co-defendants stated that inquiry 
concerning racial bias was necessary because the defendants were 
Black and the victim was White.290 The trial judge denied the 
defendants’ request that he question the potential jurors regarding 
racial prejudice but agreed to question them regarding any affiliation 
with law enforcement.291 The judge also individually questioned 
potential jurors about their impartiality.292 The trial court excused 
eighteen individuals based on their responses, including one potential 
juror who admitted a racial bias.293 Following trial, all three defendants 
were convicted on all counts, and Ross argued on appeal that the trial 
court violated his constitutional rights by failing to question the venire 
regarding racial prejudice.294 The Court found no error in the trial 
court’s decision, holding that Ham did not establish a blanket 
constitutional requirement that trial courts allow voir dire regarding 
racial bias in all criminal cases involving Black defendants.295 Instead, 
the Ristaino Court ruled that the trial court’s decision must be based 
on facts specific to the case. It noted that in Ham, the defendant’s 
argument that he was framed as a result of his work as a civil rights 
activist as well as his reputation as a civil rights activist demonstrated 
that the issue of race was “inextricably bound up with the conduct of 
the trial.”296 The Court found that these “special factors” or “racial 
factor[s]” were not present in Ross’ case, stating that “[t]he 
circumstances . . . did not suggest a significant likelihood that racial 
prejudice might infect Ross’ trial.”297 Justice Marshall dissented, 
arguing that the majority opinion in Ristaino left Ham “stillborn” and 
demonstrated that the promises of Ham and Aldridge would remain 
unfulfilled.298 
The Court would go on to establish additional limitations on a 
criminal defendant’s right to request or conduct voir dire regarding 
racial bias.299 For example, in Turner v. Murray, the Court echoed the 
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holding of Ristaino in finding that interracial violence on its own is 
not a “special circumstance” that would trigger a state trial court’s 
obligation to permit voir dire regarding potential jurors’ racial bias;300 
however, the Court found that where the defendant has been accused 
of a capital offense against a member of another race, the defendant 
has the right to request that prospective jurors be informed of the race 
of the victim and questioned regarding their potential racial biases.301 
The Court reasoned that capital defendants are entitled to this 
additional constitutional protection due to the jury’s role in capital 
sentencing: 
Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing 
hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but 
remain undetected. On the facts of this case, a juror who believes that blacks 
are violence prone or morally inferior might well be influenced by that 
belief in deciding whether petitioner’s crime involved the aggravating 
factors specified under Virginia law. . . . More subtle, less consciously held 
racial attitudes could also influence a juror’s decision in this case. Fear of 
blacks, which could easily be stirred up by the violent facts of petitioner’s 
crime, might incline a juror to favor the death penalty.302 
The Turner Court was quite insightful in that it recognized the risk 
that implicit racial bias could impact jurors’ decisions; however, the 
majority’s focus on the sentencing phase of capital cases confirmed 
that voir dire may not be available to other criminal defendants who 
are concerned about the impact of jurors’ racial biases.303 In his partial 
concurrence and dissent, Justice Brennan argued that “the 
constitutional right of a defendant to have a trial judge ask the 
members of the venire questions concerning possible racial bias is 
triggered whenever a violent interracial crime has been committed.”304 
Although the Court recognized the value of voir dire under such 
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circumstances in Rosales-Lopez v. United States, it limited its ruling 
to the federal courts, finding that the Court’s supervisory authority 
over the federal courts, rather than the Constitution, called for federal 
trial courts to inquire about racial bias when a defendant is accused of 
committing a violent crime against a member of another race.305  
The Court’s stated limitations on the use of voir dire concerning 
racial bias have left many criminal defendants unprotected. For 
example, in Rosales-Lopez, the Court found no reversible error in the 
trial judge’s decision to disallow voir dire concerning racial bias even 
though a Mexican defendant was accused of helping three other 
Mexican immigrants gain illegal entry into the United States.306 
Counsel for Rosales-Lopez requested that the trial judge allow him to 
pose the following question to the venire: “Would you consider the 
race or Mexican descent of Humberto Rosales-Lopez in your 
evaluation of this case? How would it affect you?”307 The trial judge 
refused to ask this question and instead posed the following two 
questions to the venire: “Do any of you have any feelings about the 
alien problem at all?” and “Do any of you have any particular feelings 
one way or the other about aliens or could you sit as a fair and impartial 
juror if you are called upon to do so?”308 The differences between the 
questions proposed by counsel for Rosales-Lopez and the questions 
asked by the trial judge are significant. While the questions asked by 
the judge explicitly mention “aliens” and the “alien problem,” the 
questions proposed by counsel squarely identified Rosales-Lopez’s 
race and ethnicity and asked potential jurors to consider whether racial 
or ethnic bias against individuals of Mexican descent might impact 
them.309 The Supreme Court ruled that the defendant’s constitutional 
rights were not violated by the trial judge’s decision because there 
were no “special circumstances” present that would require voir dire 
regarding racial bias.310 Moreover, the Court found that it need not 
exercise its supervisory authority over the federal trial court to require 
voir dire in this case because the crime was victimless and 
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nonviolent.311 The Rosales-Lopez analysis was a significant departure 
from Ham, when the Court found that voir dire on racial bias was 
constitutionally required in a non-violent, victimless marijuana 
possession case simply because the defendant was a civil rights 
activist.312 
Federal and state courts have imposed limitations on voir dire 
concerning racial bias in accordance with Supreme Court precedent. 
While courts have required such inquiry in cases involving interracial 
violence,313 they have not required voir dire regarding racial bias in 
cases of intraracial violence, including capital cases, despite the risk 
that jurors could rely upon racial stereotypes in making their 
decision.314 Indeed, even when the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that 
it could not understand a trial judge’s reasons for not allowing a very 
brief inquiry regarding a predominantly White venire’s racial bias in 
a federal case when a Black defendant was charged with conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine (a non-violent, victimless crime according to the 
court),315 the court found no error in the trial judge’s decision.316  
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1284 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
Arguably, the most alarming aspect of the courts’ jurisprudence 
on voir dire is the way in which courts handle a venire person who has 
expressed racial bias. The Eighth Circuit case of United States v. Ortiz 
provides an instructive example.317 In Ortiz, the federal government 
charged three Black Colombian defendants with murder, drug 
trafficking, and traveling in interstate commerce with the intent to 
commit murder for hire.318 The murder victim in the case was of 
Hispanic heritage.319 The trial judge asked potential jurors five 
questions concerning racial and/or ethnic bias: 
[1] Do you believe that certain races or ethnic groups tend to be more violent 
than others? . . . If your answer is yes, please indicate which races and 
ethnic groups you believe to be more violent. [2] Have you ever had a bad 
experience involving a person whose race is different from yours? . . . If 
your answer is yes, please describe any such experience. [3] How would 
you feel if a family of a different race moved next door to you? [Options for 
answering included:] I would favor it[,] I would be indifferent because the 
race of my neighbors makes no difference to me[, or] I would oppose it[. 4] 
The defendants in this case are Black and are accused of killing a Hispanic 
person. Would the race or ethnicity of the defendants or the victim be 
important to you in deciding between a life sentence and the death 
penalty? . . . [5] Do you have any feelings toward any racial or ethnic group 
which would cause you to judge a member of that group differently than 
you would judge a member of your own racial or ethnic group?320 
After reviewing the venire’s responses to the questionnaire, the trial 
court addressed the panel, informing them that some potential jurors 
had indicated that they have had difficulty with people of different 
races, would oppose having someone of a different race as a neighbor, 
and believed that certain races are more violent than others.321 In an 
effort to rehabilitate these individuals, the court asked: 
Is there anyone here who expressed such a belief and because of your belief, 
or for any other reason, feels that you would be less likely to believe the 
position of a black person, or a person from Colombia, as opposed to anyone 
else merely because of their race or nationality?322  
None of the panel members responded to this question.323 Later, during 
the death-penalty qualification for the jurors, the trial court 
individually questioned several potential jurors who had made 
                                                   
 317. See 315 F.3d 873, 889 (8th Cir. 2002).  
 318. See id. at 878, 890. 
 319. See id. at 890. 
 320. Id. at 889-90. 
 321. See id. at 890. 
 322. Id.  
 323. See id.  
 Bias on Trial 1285 
concerning statements on their questionnaires, but the court did not 
strike any of them for cause.324 Thus, even though certain jurors stated 
that they believed Hispanics and African Americans to be more violent 
than others, they were allowed to remain on the jury because they 
stated that the race of the defendants would not affect their decision.325 
The trial court also allowed a juror to remain who indicated that he 
believed certain races to be more violent but did not identify any 
particular race.326 Another juror failed to respond to each of the racial 
bias questions included in the questionnaire.327 The trial court denied 
defense counsel’s request that these jurors be subject to additional 
questioning.328 The Eighth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the 
trial court’s handling of these potential jurors.329 Additionally, because 
defense counsel used their peremptory strikes to remove several of 
these potential jurors, the court determined that the defendants 
suffered no actual prejudice.330 
The effectiveness of voir dire concerning racial bias, where 
allowed, varies depending on the questions that are posed to potential 
jurors as well as the courts’ willingness to remove those venire persons 
who express racial bias. If one considers federal and state courts’ 
reluctance to allow voir dire regarding racial bias together with some 
courts’ refusal to strike potential jurors who admit their prejudices, it 
certainly appears that voir dire is not a particularly strong method for 
ridding juries of racial bias.  
B. Jury Instructions  
The Pena-Rodriguez Court identified courts’ instructions to 
jurors as another safeguard that protects against racial bias.331 The 
Court noted jury instructions reminding jurors of their duty to make 
decisions without bias or prejudice are fairly common as are 
instructions encouraging jurors to engage in active deliberation and 
consultation with their fellow jurors.332 In his dissent to the majority 
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opinion, Justice Alito expressed his belief that jury instructions can 
effectively prevent bias from impacting a jury’s verdict.333  
Although the Pena-Rodriguez Court found value in jury 
instructions that mention bias generally,334 lower courts appear quite 
reluctant to allow instructions that specifically mention racial bias or 
provide guidance to jurors on the ways in which they can avoid 
making a racially biased decision. In United States v. Diaz-Arias, the 
First Circuit Court of Appeals found no error in the trial court’s refusal 
to allow the defendant’s proposed racial bias instruction.335 There, the 
defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine.336 At 
trial, he requested that the trial judge provide the jury with the 
following instruction: “It would be improper for you to consider, in 
reaching your decision as to whether the government sustained its 
burden of proof, any personal feelings you may have about the 
defendant’s race or ethnicity, or national origin, or his or any witness’s 
immigration status.”337 The trial judge refused to give defendant’s 
proposed instruction and instead opted to give a more general 
instruction concerning bias: 
You should determine what facts have been shown or not based solely on a 
fair consideration of the evidence. That proposition means two things, of 
course. First of all, you’ll be completely fair-minded and impartial, swayed 
neither by prejudice, nor sympathy, by personal likes or dislikes toward 
anybody involved in the case, but simply to fairly and impartially judge the 
evidence and what it means.338 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court’s instruction was 
inadequate in that it did not address the prevalence of stereotypes 
linking Hispanics with drug trafficking.339 Defendant also argued that 
an instruction specifically mentioning race or ethnicity was necessary 
given that Blacks and Hispanics are more likely than Whites to be 
imprisoned for drug-related crimes. Defendant claimed that an 
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instruction specifically mentioning race or ethnicity “was necessary to 
dispel any notion among the jurors that being Hispanic in and of itself 
is evidence of guilt in a drug crime.”340 The First Circuit disagreed, 
finding that the trial judge’s general instruction on prejudice and 
impartiality sufficiently addressed the concerns raised by the 
defendant.341 The court noted that defendant offered no evidence that 
the jurors hearing his case harbored any sort of bias against him, and 
the court refused to presume that racial bias exists generally.342 The 
court also noted that the defendant was allowed to address his 
concerns by conducting voir dire regarding race, ethnicity, national 
origin, and immigration status.343 Because Diaz-Arias did not uncover 
evidence of actual bias among his jurors, the court ruled that he was 
not entitled to a jury instruction specifically addressing racial and 
ethnic bias.344 In essence, the First Circuit did not allow the defendant 
to utilize the safeguard of juror instruction because he did not already 
possess evidence of racial bias among his jurors.345 
The Diaz-Arias outcome is not limited to federal courts. Two 
recent state supreme court cases highlight the difficulties defendants 
face when they attempt to introduce race-specific instructions to jurors 
in an effort to educate them regarding the prevalence of racial bias.346 
In State v. Plain, the defendant, an African American, was charged 
with one count of harassment in the first degree.347 The alleged victims 
of the defendant’s crime were his two White neighbors.348 At trial, the 
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defendant requested that the judge provide the following instruction to 
the jury: 
Reach your verdict without discrimination. In reaching your verdict, you 
must not consider the defendant’s race, color, religious beliefs, national 
origin, or sex. You are not to return a verdict for or against the defendant 
unless you would return the same verdict without regard to his race, color, 
religious belief, national origin, or sex.349 
The trial court refused to give defendant’s proposed instruction 
because it was not included in the Iowa State Bar Association’s model 
instructions.350 Even though the Iowa Supreme Court found that 
defendant’s proposed instruction correctly stated the law, it found no 
prejudicial error in the trial court’s refusal to utilize the instruction.351 
The court found that the instruction would have been permitted under 
Iowa law even though it was not included in the model instructions; 
however, the trial court was not required to give the instruction.352 
Moreover, because the government offered strong evidence of 
defendant’s guilt, the court found that he was not prejudiced by the 
trial court’s refusal to give the instruction.353 The court acknowledged 
that judges must play a role in eradicating implicit bias in the justice 
system and encouraged lower courts to give instructions like the one 
proposed by defendant, but the court rejected the idea that it should 
order a specific process for addressing implicit bias.354  
The Kansas Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in State 
v. Nesbitt.355 Nesbitt, an African–American man, was charged with 
felony murder, rape, and aggravated battery, and his alleged victim 
was a 100-year-old White woman.356 At the close of all evidence at 
trial, the defendant requested that the trial judge give a “race 
switching” instruction to the jury.357 The proposed instruction 
cautioned the jurors against relying on racial stereotypes when making 
their decision and stated that doing so would violate the defendant’s 
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rights.358 The instruction also directed the jury to engage in a race-
switching exercise to determine whether their analysis of the case was 
impacted by implicit bias: 
To ensure that you have not made any unfair assessments based on racial 
stereotypes, you should apply a race-switching instruction exercise to test 
whether stereotypes have affected your evaluation of the case. “Race 
Switching,” involves imagining the same events, the same circumstances, 
the same people, but switching the races of the particular witnesses. For 
example if the accused is African–American and the accuser/victim is 
white, you should imagine a White accused and a black accuser/victim. If 
your evaluation of the case is different after engaging in race-switching, this 
suggests a subconscious reliance on stereotypes. You must then reevaluate 
the case from a neutral, unbiased perspective.359 
The trial court refused to provide the instruction to the jury.360 
Ultimately, the jury found defendant guilty on all three counts.361 On 
appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in refusing to give 
the race-switching instruction.362 The Kansas Supreme Court noted 
that federal law requires that the trial judge provide a racial bias 
instruction to capital sentencing juries.363 The Court stated, however, 
that outside the context of federal death penalty cases, state and federal 
courts have been very reluctant to instruct juries concerning racial 
bias.364 In the end, the Court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to give 
the instruction to the jury because it unlawfully called for the jury to 
imagine a hypothetical set of facts that was not before the jury.365 
According to the Court, “Kansas juries have a singular function: 
Deciding cases only on evidence actually and validly presented to 
them. They are not to imagine another set of facts and then allow that 
imagination to affect their deliberations.”366 Finally, the Nesbitt Court 
noted that voir dire provides an opportunity for both parties to explore 
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potential jurors’ racial biases and encourage them to consider the 
possibility that they might harbor subconscious biases.367 
Despite many courts’ reluctance to instruct juries on racial bias, 
some state courts or court-commissioned committees have published 
model jury instructions that caution jurors to avoid identity-based bias, 
including racial bias, in making their decisions.368 Interestingly, some 
jurisdictions offer civil jury instructions that address racial bias but 
have not crafted equivalent instructions for criminal cases where a 
defendant’s freedom is at stake.369  
As attorneys and judges have become more familiar with the 
concept of implicit bias and the ways in which it could impact jurors, 
some states have developed jury instructions that specifically address 
implicit bias. For example, the Pennsylvania Bar Institute’s model 
civil jury instruction on bias states:  
Each one of us has biases about or certain perceptions or stereotypes of other 
people. We may be aware of some of our biases, though we may not share 
them with others. We may not be fully aware of some of our other biases. 
Our biases often affect how we act, favorably or unfavorably, toward 
someone. Bias can affect our thoughts, how we remember, what we see and 
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 368. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION COMM. OF THE STATE BAR OF 
ARIZ., REVISED ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) CAPITAL CASE SENTENCING 
INSTRUCTIONS r. 2.1 (4th ed. 2016) (“You must not be influenced by your personal 
feelings of bias or prejudice for or against the defendant or any person involved in this 
case on the basis of anyone’s race, color, religion, national ancestry, gender[,] or 
sexual orientation.”).  
Do not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence your 
decision. Bias includes, but is not limited to, bias for or against the 
witnesses, attorneys, or defendant[s] or alleged victim[s] based on 
disability, gender, nationality, national origin, race or ethnicity, religion, 
gender identity, sexual orientation, age, [or] socioeconomic status. . . .  
JUDICIAL COUNSEL OF CAL. ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS r. 200 (2018).  
 369. Compare OKLA. STATE COURTS NETWORK, OKLAHOMA UNIFORM JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS – CRIMINAL r. 1-4 (2013) (cautioning criminal jurors that they “must 
be as free as humanly possible from bias, prejudice, or sympathy” but failing to list 
specific types of bias), with OKLA. STATE COURTS NETWORK, OKLAHOMA UNIFORM 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS – CIVIL r. 1.5 (2018) (“Remember that under our justice system 
the race, religion, national origin, or social status of a party or [his/her] attorney must 
not be considered by you in the discharge of your sworn duty as a juror.”). 
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hear, whom we believe or disbelieve, and how we make important 
decisions.370  
The instruction goes on to instruct jurors that they must not allow bias 
to influence their decision.371 Like Oklahoma, Pennsylvania does not 
offer an equivalent bias instruction for criminal cases.372  
Washington State’s pattern civil instructions also address 
implicit bias. After directing jurors to make their decision without 
relying on “conscious biases” and listing the various types of biases 
that might impact jurors,373 Washington’s pattern introductory 
instruction to juries states:  
[T]here is another more subtle tendency at work that we must all be aware 
of. This part of human nature is understandable but must play no role in 
your service as jurors. In our daily lives, there are many issues that require 
us to make quick decisions and then move on. In making these daily 
decisions, we may well rely upon generalities, even what might be called 
biases or prejudices. That may be appropriate as a coping mechanism in our 
busy daily lives but bias and prejudice can play no part in any decisions you 
might make as a juror. Your decisions as jurors must be based solely upon 
                                                   
 370. See PA. BAR INST., PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CIVIL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS r. 1.140 (2018); accord. JUDICIAL COUNSEL OF CAL. ADVISORY COMM. 
ON CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS r. 113 (2018). 
 371. See PA. BAR INST., supra note 370 (“You must not be biased in favor of 
or against any party or witness because of his or her disability, gender, race, religion, 
ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, national origin, [or] socioeconomic status[, or 
[insert any other impermissible form of bias]].”). 
 372. See CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION COMM., PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
ON IMPLICIT BIAS r. 103 (2017), https://www.arcourts.gov/sites/ 
default/files/tree/implicit%20bias%20w%20att.pdf [https://perma.cc/87CS-LHBL] 
(“Our biases often affect how we act, favorably or unfavorably, toward someone. Bias 
can affect our thoughts, how we remember, what we see and hear, whom we believe 
or disbelieve, and how we make important decisions. Witnesses can have the same 
implicit biases.”); see generally PA. BAR INST., PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD 
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (2016). Arkansas’ Criminal Jury Instruction 
Committee has proposed significant modifications to existing model instructions that 
would define implicit bias for criminal juries and explain how bias can impact the 
decision-making process. See CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION COMM., supra, at r. 101, 
103. 
 373. WASH. STATE SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 
WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS – CIVIL r. 1.01 (6th ed. 2017).  
It is important that you discharge your duties without discrimination, 
meaning that bias regarding the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, 
sexual orientation, gender, or disability of any party, any witnesses, and the 
lawyers should play no part in the exercise of your judgment throughout the 
trial. These are called ‘conscious biases’—and, when answering questions, 
it is important, even if uncomfortable for you, to share these views with the 
lawyers. 
Id. 
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an open-minded, fair consideration of the evidence that comes before you 
during trial.374  
In the comments following this instruction, the drafters acknowledge 
the detrimental impact that racial bias can have on the administration 
of justice and indicate their intention to define both conscious and 
unconscious bias for Washington State juries.375 While the drafters’ 
goal is laudable, the pattern of addressing implicit bias solely in civil 
jury instructions continues. Washington State’s pattern criminal 
instructions provide no information on conscious versus subconscious 
bias, and no instructions list the types of biases a juror might harbor 
unknowingly.376 
At the federal level, the availability of racial bias or implicit bias 
instructions varies by jurisdiction. In the federal district court for the 
Western District of Washington, parties to criminal actions have 
access to a set of instructions that defines conscious and unconscious 
bias in various model instructions, including a preliminary instruction, 
a witness credibility instruction, and a closing instruction.377 The 
district court also produced a ten minute video that educates jurors on 
unconscious bias.378 Similarly, the Honorable Mark W. Bennett, a 
judge in the Northern District of Iowa and a preeminent scholar on the 
topic of implicit bias in the courtroom,379 provides the following 
implicit bias instruction to each of his juries: 
Do not decide the case based on “implicit biases.” As we discussed in jury 
selection, everyone, including me, has feelings, assumptions, perceptions, 
fears, and stereotypes, that is, “implicit biases,” that we may not be aware 
of. These hidden thoughts can impact what we see and hear, how we 
                                                   
 374. Id.  
 375. See id. at r. 1.01 cmt.  
 376. See generally WASH. STATE SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS – CRIMINAL (4th ed. 
2016).  
 377. W.D. WASH. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION, http://www.wawd.uscourts. 
gov/sites/wawd/files/CriminalJuryInstructions-ImplicitBias.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BL7V-39NC] (last visited Mar. 3, 2019).  
 378. See Western Washington District Court, Unconscious Bias, YOUTUBE 
(Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1&v= 
hdjBbfdRLkA [https://perma.cc/PR62-4WMH]. 
 379. See generally Mark W. Bennett, The Implicit Racial Bias in Sentencing: 
The Next Frontier, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 391 (2017); Justin Levinson, Mark W. 
Bennett, & Koichi Hioki, Judging Implicit Bias: A National Empirical Study of 
Judicial Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L. REV. 63 (2017); Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the 
Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated 
Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 149 (2010). 
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remember what we see and hear, and how we make important decisions. 
Because you are making very important decisions in this case, I strongly 
encourage you to evaluate the evidence carefully and to resist jumping to 
conclusions based on personal likes or dislikes, generalizations, gut 
feelings, prejudices, sympathies, stereotypes, or biases. The law demands 
that you return a just verdict, based solely on the evidence, your individual 
evaluations of that evidence, your reason and common sense, and these 
instructions. Our system of justice is counting on you to render a fair 
decision based on the evidence, not on biases.380 
While Judge Bennett and other federal judges should be commended 
for their efforts to raise jurors’ awareness on the issue of implicit bias, 
jurors’ accessibility to this information is very dependent upon the trial 
judge’s willingness to mention bias. The model criminal jury 
instructions published by the federal circuit courts mention bias briefly 
if at all and do not mention implicit bias or stereotypes, thus leaving 
to trial judges the discretion to introduce these topics to jurors.381  
                                                   
 380. Mark W. Bennett, Implicit Bias Jury Instruction, WIS. ST. PUB. 
DEFENDERS, https://www.wispd.org/attachments/article/101/ 
ImplicitBiasJuryInstruction.pdf [https://perma.cc/DTL2-KXMF] (last visited Mar. 3, 
2019). 
 381. See generally U.S. DIST. COURT DIST. OF ME., PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT (2018), 
http://www.med.uscourts.gov/pdf/crpjilinks.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5UP-WJFA] 
(failing to mention bias). Accord COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS DIST. 
JUDGES ASS’N FIFTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) 
(2015), http://www.lb5.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions/ [https://perma.cc/LP2Y-
XLP9]; JUDICIAL COMM. ON MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, 
MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT (2017), http://www.juryinstructions.ca8.uscourts.gov/ 
criminal_instructions.htm [https://perma.cc/E725-CQCR]; CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTION COMM. OF THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT, 
CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (2011), https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/ 
sites/default/files/clerk/Jury%20Instructions%20Update%202018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NEP9-6WW8] (failing to mention bias and only mentioning race in 
the context of capital sentencing as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3593(f)); COMM. ON 
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, 
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) (2016), 
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/courtdocs/clk/FormCriminalPattern
JuryInstructions2016Rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS3R-Q8V8]; see also COMM. ON 
MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS THIRD CIRCUIT, MODEL CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT r. 102 (2012), 
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/model-criminal-jury-table-contents-and-instructions 
[https://perma.cc/G8QX-94XC] (instructing jurors that they “should also not be 
influenced by any person’s race, color, religion, national ancestry, or gender[, sexual 
orientation, profession, occupation, celebrity, economic circumstances, or position in 
life or in the community]” but failing to mention implicit or unconscious bias); SIXTH 
CIRCUIT COMM. ON PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS r. 1.02 (2019), http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/ 
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In this Part, I have explored the barriers that will welcome any 
criminal defendant who seeks to ferret out racial bias by utilizing the 
two preemptive safeguards identified by the Pena-Rodriguez Court. 
The tools of voir dire and jury instructions are available to most 
defendants only at the whim of the trial judge, and the trial court’s 
denial of the defendant’s request will be largely insulated from 
appellate review. In order for these safeguards to provide the 
protection described in Pena-Rodriguez, trial courts must demonstrate 
more openness to the possibility that most jurors enter the courtroom 
with some sort of bias. Additionally, courts must adopt a new way of 
educating jurors about their biases. To be effective, these changes 
must be grounded in the truth. 
III. HOW TO TELL THE TRUTH IN THE COURTROOM 
The process of truth and reconciliation can help us tell the truth 
in the American courtroom. Truth and reconciliation commissions 
assist communities in raising awareness of past injustices, providing 
recognition and closure for victims and other community members.382 
Truth and reconciliation commissions engage in community healing 
by “exposing facts and acknowledging past wrongs.”383 Additionally, 
these commissions sometimes “assist in the creation of well-informed 
                                                   
sites/ca6/files/documents/pattern_jury/pdf/crmpattjur_full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7CEV-GXFU] (stating “[d]o not let any bias, sympathy or prejudice 
that you may feel toward one side or the other influence your decision in any way” 
but failing to mention racial or implicit bias); COMM. ON FED. CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF 
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT r. 101 (2012), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/ 
pattern-jury-instructions/7th_criminal_jury_instr.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QAG-
GH47] (failing to mention implicit bias but stating “[d]o not let sympathy, prejudice, 
fear, or public opinion influence you . . . [and], do not let any person’s race, color, 
religion, national ancestry, or gender influence you” (internal brackets omitted)); 
NINTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT r. 3.1 (2010), 
http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/sites/ 
default/files/WPD/Criminal_Instructions_2018_6.pdf [https://perma.cc/RT4Q-
MBXM] (cautioning jurors to avoid prejudice based on various identities, including 
race, but failing to mention implicit bias). It appears that the Second, Fourth, and 
Federal Circuits have not published model jury instructions. See Jury Instructions 
Research Guide: United States Courts of Appeals, MARQUETTE U. LAW SCH., 
http://libraryguides.law.marquette.edu/c.php?g=318617&p=3680634 
[https://perma.cc/43Q3-LQWF] (last visited Mar. 3, 2019). 
 382. See Heather Parker, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: A Needed 
Force in Alaska?, 34 ALASKA L. REV. 27, 28 (2017). 
 383. Id. at 32. 
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policies and can provide a step towards social equity for previously 
victimized populations.”384 Comparing the truths exposed during 
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation process with the truths 
exposed during court proceedings, Albie Sachs, a Justice of the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa opined that the truth and 
reconciliation process was far superior: 
So little truth comes out of court hearings––truth on which you can 
confidently rely. So much truth came pouring out of the Truth Commission, 
you would think due process of law is a greater guarantee of truth than the 
very open proceedings of the TRC, but it was the other way around. There 
was a veracity, an honesty, an integrity when you just heard the people 
speaking, and they weren’t speaking to denounce somebody in the 
defendant’s dock, or to get more money; they were speaking simply to 
relieve themselves of the pain. But also there was the corroboration from 
the mouths of the perpetrators themselves, truth from two sides. And it 
worried me at first, as a lawyer, a judge, that due process seemed to reveal 
so little truth while these other processes without strict regulation were so 
productive of truth.385  
Justice Sachs’ description of the truth and reconciliation process, a 
process where participants are driven by their desire for 
acknowledgment and healing, leaves me wondering how we can bring 
the same sense of righteousness to our adversarial justice system, 
where the desire, even the need, to win will certainly discourage the 
telling of the truth. 
I believe that the best way to introduce the American courtroom 
to the truth about our tendency to traffic in racial bias is to make race 
salient at trial. For many years, social scientists and legal scholars have 
argued that the open acknowledgement of race at trial can reduce the 
likelihood of racial bias.386 In one study, Sommers and Ellsworth found 
that an explicit mention of race significantly impacted White mock 
jurors in that they were equally likely to vote to convict the mock 
defendant regardless of race.387 On the other hand, when race was not 
mentioned, the White mock jurors were more likely to convict and 
give longer sentence recommendations to the Black defendant.388 
Sommers and Ellsworth found that White jurors in non-race-salient 
situations are also more likely to perceive Black defendants as more 
violent as compared to White defendants and to perceive White 
                                                   
 384. Id. at 33-34. 
 385. Albie Sachs, Truth and Reconciliation, 52 SMU L. REV. 1563, 1571 
(1999). 
 386. See Sommers and Ellsworth, supra note 15, at 1015. 
 387. See id. 
 388. See id. 
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defendants as more honest and moral.389 These differences in 
perception disappeared when race was made salient.390 Sommers and 
Ellsworth concluded that there is sufficient support for their theory 
that White juror bias is more likely to occur in trials where racial issues 
are not salient.391 Lee argues that race salience impacts jurors because 
“most Americans will try to avoid appearing racist in situations when 
it would be obvious to others that they are acting in a racially biased 
manner.”392 When race is made salient, jurors are reminded that they 
could be perceived as racist, and they are more likely to make 
decisions in accordance with their principles.393 Lee notes that making 
race salient is doing something more than identifying the races of the 
parties: “Race salience means making jurors aware of racial issues that 
can bias their decision-making, like the operation of racial 
stereotypes.”394 
If race salience can move us toward the truth described by Justice 
Sachs, what practical changes must our justice system make to allow 
for an open discussion of racial bias and stereotypes in the courtroom? 
First and foremost, trial judges must better educate themselves on the 
prevalence and impact of racial bias and stereotypes among jurors. As 
Part II describes, a trial judge can choose to shut down all discussion 
of racial bias, and appellate courts will overturn that decision only in 
very limited circumstances.395 The move toward mentioning implicit 
or unconscious bias in jury instructions signals that some courts are 
                                                   
 389. See id. 
 390. See id. In 2001, Sommers and Ellsworth conducted a race salience study 
based on a fact pattern of an assault involving members of a basketball team. See id. 
at 1016. The mock jurors knew the races of the defendants in each scenario, but in the 
race-salient scenario, the facts stated that the team had been dealing with racial tension 
for the entire season and that the defendant (either Black or White) was the only 
member of his race who was on the team. See id. In the race-salient scenario, jurors’ 
decisions were not impacted by the defendant’s race; however, in the non-race-salient 
scenario, where the assault was the result of social tension, not racial tension, jurors 
were more likely to convict the Black defendant. See id. at 1016.  
 391. See id. at 1015.  
 392. Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in 
a Not Yet Post-Racal Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1573 (2013). 
 393. See id. 
 394. Id. at 1586. Lee argues that making race salient does not give an 
advantage to people of color. See id. at 1588. Rather, it “even[s] the scales,” causing 
jurors to treat White defendants and defendants of color equally. Id. She notes that 
“[f]ailing to make race salient, however, seems to lead to unequal treatment of 
similarly situated defendants, with the Black defendants receiving the short end of the 
stick.” Id. 
 395. See supra Part II (describing courts’ reluctance to use voir dire and jury 
instructions to ferret out racial bias). 
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willing to allow for more discussion of racial bias in the courtroom,  
however, a party’s access to these instructions as well as the safeguard 
of voir dire varies depending on the individual judge.  We will not see 
a system-wide reduction in jurors’ reliance on racial stereotypes until 
the use of these safeguards becomes a standard part of trial practice 
Looking to specific methods for raising the topic of racial bias 
during trial, trial courts must also consider allowing for an open 
discussion of racial stereotypes by attorneys. I am not proposing 
attorney argument similar to the explicit appeals to racial prejudice 
that were common in the past.396 Instead, attorneys would have leeway 
to discuss stereotypes with the jury subject to the objections of 
opposing counsel. Allowing for counsel to speak openly about 
stereotypes in court will give defendants some recourse when 
prosecutors engage in subtle, subconscious priming of jurors.397 
Additionally, in cases where race should be made salient in the trial or 
where a race-switching exercise might change the jury’s assessment 
of the case, attorneys should be allowed to discuss racial bias during 
opening statements and closing arguments. Legal scholars have 
explored very detailed methods for countering implicit bias through 
narrative,398 so I will not spend more time on this method. Instead, this 
Part will explore my ideas for changes that could occur during voir 
dire and in jury instructions. 
A. An Open Discussion of Racial Stereotypes During Voir Dire 
In Section II.A., I discussed the courts’ reluctance to allow voir 
dire regarding racial bias as well as some courts’ unwillingness to 
dismiss potential jurors who express racial bias.399 I disagree with the 
constraints the courts have placed on minority defendants in criminal 
                                                   
 396. See supra Part I (discussing the prevalence and impact of racial bias 
among jurors).  
 397. Some skilled advocates who are aware of the power of subtle stereotype 
priming have attempted to turn the tables on prosecutors by subtly priming the jury 
with principles of fairness and justice and counter-stereotypes that portray the 
defendant in a positive light. See Pamela A. Wilkins, Confronting the Invisible 
Witness: The Use of Narrative to Neutralize Capital Jurors’ Implicit Racial Biases, 
115 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 351-58 (2012).  
 398. See generally id. 
 399. See supra Section II.A (arguing that the effectiveness of voir dire 
concerning racial bias varies depending on the questions posed and the courts’ 
willingness to remove jurors who express racial bias). 
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cases400 and believe these defendants should have the ability to pose 
voir dire questions regarding racial bias even if the special 
circumstances described by the Supreme Court have not been met.401 
Because the Court has not ruled that criminal defendants of color have 
a blanket right to conduct voir dire regarding racial bias, we are left 
with a hit or miss system that may or may not allow for such inquiry. 
To be sure, there are risks associated with conducting voir dire 
regarding racial bias. An attorney may determine that not inquiring 
about racial bias is the best plan of action for his or her client.402 Thus, 
the decision should lie with defendants and their counsel. 
If a defendant decides to conduct voir dire regarding racial bias, 
then defense counsel must proceed carefully. Asking the jurors if they 
are racists in open court is likely to backfire.403 Inquiry through 
individual questionnaires is likely a better method. The questionnaire 
that the trial court provided to the venire in United States v. Ortiz 
included questions that made race salient while also demanding that 
potential jurors do more than merely deny that they are racists.404 The 
questionnaire included the following helpful questions: 
[1] Do you believe that certain races or ethnic groups tend to be more violent 
than others? . . . If your answer is yes, please indicate which races and 
ethnic groups you believe to be more violent. [2] Have you ever had a bad 
experience involving a person whose race is different from yours? . . . If 
your answer is yes, please describe any such experience. [3] How would 
you feel if a family of a different race moved next door to you? [Options for 
                                                   
 400. I believe that civil litigants should also have the freedom to address racial 
bias and stereotypes; however, a discussion of the civil justice system is outside the 
scope of this Article. 
 401. See supra Section II.A (arguing that limitations on the use of voir dire 
concerning racial bias have left criminal defendants unprotected).  
 402. See Pena-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 291 n.5 (Colo. 2015), rev’d 
and remanded on other grounds by Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 
(2017) (“[A] defense attorney’s decision not to ask about racial bias—and to instead 
attempt to root out prejudice through generalized questioning—is entirely defensible 
as a matter of strategy.”); see also United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87 n.5 (1st Cir. 
2009) (“[M]any defense attorneys have sound tactical reasons for not proposing 
specific voir dire questions regarding racial or ethnic bias because it might be viewed 
as insulting to jurors or as raising an issue defense counsel does not want to 
highlight.”). 
 403. See Lee, supra note 392, at 1592 (“If permitted to engage in voir dire into 
racial bias, an attorney would be wise not to start by asking prospective jurors whether 
any of them are racially biased. A question like this is likely to offend the prospective 
juror who may interpret such a question as an inquiry into whether the prospective 
juror is a racist.”). 
 404. See United States v. Oritz, 315 F.3d 873, 889-90 (8th Cir. 2002).  
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answering included:] I would favor it[,] I would be indifferent because the 
race of my neighbors makes no difference to me[, or] I would oppose it[.]405 
I believe this questionnaire can be expanded to include questions that 
inquire about stereotypes commonly attributed to the parties in the 
case. For example, in a case where a Black defendant is accused of 
raping a White woman and the defendant asserts consent as his 
defense, it would appropriate to inquire regarding the venire’s beliefs 
about interracial sex:  
 
How would you feel if one of your female family members 
married [or had sex with] an individual of a different race?” 
Options for answering would include: “I would favor it,” “I 
would be indifferent because the race of family member’s 
spouse [sexual partner] makes no difference to me,” and “I 
would oppose it. 
 
Another appropriate question for the rape case would be: 
 
Do you believe that certain races or ethnic groups tend to 
be more likely to commit rape? If your answer is yes, please 
indicate which races and ethnic groups you believe more 
likely to commit rape. 
 
In a case where an individual of Arab descent is charged with criminal 
terrorist activity, an appropriate question would be: 
 
Do you believe that certain races or ethnic groups tend to 
be more likely to engage in terrorism? If your answer is yes, 
please indicate which races and ethnic groups you believe 
more likely to engage in terrorism. 
 
These questions are valuable not only because they may assist the 
court in identifying biased jurors but also because they will remind 
low-prejudiced or non-prejudiced individuals of their values, thereby 
reducing the likelihood that those jurors will rely on racial 
stereotypes.406 
The most important aspect of my proposal on voir dire concerns 
the trial judge’s approach for handling a prospective juror who openly 
admits bias. The trial judge in Ortiz did not require all potential jurors 
                                                   
 405. Id. at 890. 
 406. See Lee, supra note 392, at 1573. 
1300 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
to complete the questionnaire and attempted to rehabilitate the 
individuals who disclosed their bias by asking the entire panel whether 
their beliefs would impact their ability to “believe the position” of a 
person because of their race.407 None of the panelists responded to this 
question. During the death penalty phase of the trial, the trial judge 
met with several potential jurors who had disclosed their biases, but 
the judge did not strike any of them from the panel. 408 To make matters 
worse, the judge did not allow defense counsel to conduct follow-up 
inquiry with the panelists who disclosed their biases or failed to 
complete the questionnaire.409 Ultimately, defense counsel was forced 
to use peremptory strikes to remove several of these potential jurors. 
Under my proposal, potential jurors who disclose their belief in 
racial stereotypes would be struck for cause unless they can properly 
rehabilitate themselves. The trial judge in Ortiz attempted to 
rehabilitate biased jurors with a single question about their ability to 
be fair,410 but no “magic question” can ensure that biased jurors will 
not rely on their biases.411 While I am not opposed to the trial judge 
and counsel engaging in further inquiry with such jurors, the trial court 
should presume that they will be struck for cause unless they are able 
to rehabilitate themselves to the satisfaction of the court and counsel. 
B. An Open Discussion of Racial Stereotypes in Jury Instructions 
Like voir dire questioning, jury instructions on racial bias and 
stereotypes should be available whenever requested by minority 
defendants in criminal cases. Additionally, I disagree with the Kansas 
Supreme Court’s determination that a race-switching instruction, 
which asks jurors to switch the races of the parties to ensure that bias 
has not affected their decision, is an improper hypothetical.412 My 
                                                   
 407. See Ortiz, 315 F.3d at 890. 
 408. See id. at 890-92. 
 409. See id. at 891. 
 410. See id. at 890. 
 411. Gamble v. Comm., 68 S.W.3d 367, 373 (Ky. 2002) (“One of the myths 
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answers which would otherwise disqualify him by reason of bias or prejudice may be 
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based solely on the evidence presented in court and the court’s instruction.”). The 
Kentucky Supreme Court noted that this “magic question” on its own cannot 
rehabilitate a biased juror. Id.  
 412. See supra notes 351-61 and accompanying text; see also Lee, supra note 
392, at 1599-1600 (proposing a race-switching jury instruction).  
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proposals regarding jury instructions build upon the work of courts 
and jury instruction committees who routinely educate jurors about 
the prevalence of implicit bias.413 While some of these proposed 
instructions do not mention race specifically,414 others make race 
salient by explicitly identifying widely known stereotypes and 
educating jurors on the specific ways in which stereotypes can impact 
their work as jurors.415  
1. Life Experiences Instruction 
Current instructions encourage jurors to use their life 
experiences and common sense to assess trial evidence but doing so 
may necessarily involve the application of stereotypes.416 Modeled 
after New York’s Pattern Civil Instruction on jurors’ use of 
professional expertise,417 my proposed instruction states: 
 
Although as jurors you are encouraged to use all of your 
life experiences and common sense when analyzing trial 
evidence and reaching a fair verdict, you must understand 
that it is unfair to make decisions based on assumptions or 
stereotypes about people who are different from you. If your 
life experiences include stereotypes about people who are 
different from you, you must not rely on those experiences. 
 
                                                   
 413. See generally Lee, supra note 392 (discussing educating jurors about 
implicit bias). 
 414. See infra Subsections III.B.1-2 (describing the life experiences 
instruction and the instruction on stereotypes). The Life Experiences and Stereotypes 
Instructions educate jurors on the impact of stereotypes generally and will be 
applicable in any case where defendants are concerned that jurors may make 
stereotypic judgments. See id.  
 415. See infra Subsection III.B.3 (explaining the instruction on specific racial 
stereotypes). 
 416. See Levinson, supra note 208, at 376 (“[W]hen people attempt to recall 
information that is somewhat hazy in their memories, they generally rely on 
familiarity and expectations to help fill in the content of those memories. But 
familiarity and expectations can be code for stereotypes.”). 
 417. See COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS ASS’N OF SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES, NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS – CIVIL r. 1:25A (2018). The 
instruction encourages jurors to rely on their life experiences but prohibits them from 
communicating any personal professional expertise to other jurors during 
deliberations. See id. 
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Even though this instruction is brief and does not specifically address 
racial bias, it provides an important reminder that jurors should not 
rely too heavily on their personal experiences. 
2. Instruction on General Racial Stereotypes 
My proposed instruction on stereotypes reflects well-settled 
research on the impact that racial bias can have on jurors. It 
incorporates the Pennsylvania Bar Institute’s model civil jury 
instruction on bias and provides more information on stereotypes: 418 
 
Each one of us has biases about or certain perceptions or 
stereotypes of other people. We may be aware of some of our 
biases, though we may not share them with others. We may 
not be fully aware of some of our other biases.  
Our biases often affect how we act, favorably or 
unfavorably, toward someone. Bias can affect our thoughts, 
how we remember, what we see and hear, whom we believe 
or disbelieve, and how we make important decisions. Bias and 
stereotypes can cause us: (1) to be skeptical of people who are 
different from us; (2) to remember information that is 
consistent with stereotypes and forget information that is 
inconsistent with stereotypes; and (3) to fill any evidence gaps 
with stereotypes. Stereotypes can also cause us to more easily 
believe witnesses who are like us. 
As jurors you are being asked to make very important 
decisions in this case. You must not let bias, prejudice, or 
public opinion influence your decision. You must not be 
biased in favor of or against any party or witness because of 
his or her disability, gender, race, religion, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, age, national origin, [or] socioeconomic status [, 
or [insert any other impermissible form of bias]]. 
Your verdict must be based solely on the evidence 
presented. You must not use stereotypes as evidence. You must 
carefully evaluate the evidence and resist any urge to reach a 
verdict that is influenced by bias for or against any party or 
witness.  
                                                   
 418. See PENN. BAR INSTITUTE, PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CIVIL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS r. 1.140 (4th ed. 2014); accord. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL. 
ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA 
CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS r. 113 (2018). 
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This instruction builds upon a very effective instruction on bias and 
provides jurors with some additional education regarding stereotypes. 
Unlike the Pennsylvania instruction, this proposed instruction would 
be available to all criminal defendants who seek an instruction on bias. 
3. Instruction on Specific Racial Stereotypes 
It is quite risky to introduce specific racial stereotypes to jurors 
who would have been unaware of them otherwise. One might argue 
that planting the seeds of prejudice where they do not already exist 
would be incredibly harmful to my ultimate goal of eliminating racial 
bias in the justice system. The decision to introduce specific 
stereotypes to the jury in an effort to make them salient must rest with 
defendants and defense counsel. In making this decision, they should 
consider whether the jury has already been primed with racial 
stereotypes.419 Carodine argues that whenever a Black defendant 
enters the courtroom, his or her race will be relevant: “[T]hat is, race 
has a tendency to prove or disprove something in the American justice 
system just as it does in society at large. Race is indeed evidence and 
is automatically admissible, as we do not shield a person’s race from 
the jury.”420  
This Article has identified many commonly held stereotypes that 
could come into play during a criminal trial, but the list is certainly not 
exhaustive.421 Attempting to draft a list of stereotypes is risky as well, 
for “jurors might think it appropriate to rely on [any] omitted 
stereotype.”422 Nevertheless, I believe that openly identifying certain 
widely known stereotypes will help jurors who want to identify and 
reject racial stereotypes. Where an attorney is concerned that certain 
stereotypes might impact the jury, he or she would identify the 
stereotypes of concern and draft an instruction using the model 
proposed below.  
                                                   
 419. See Levinson & Young, supra note 95, at 327 (stating “that stereotypes 
are activated easily, automatically, and often unconsciously”). 
 420. Carodine, supra note 46, at 567. 
 421. See supra Part I (identifying the following stereotypes: Blacks as 
criminally inclined, animalistic, violent, sexually unrestrained, dishonest, hostile, 
angry, and unintelligent; Latinos as undocumented, foreign, criminally inclined, and 
violent; Arabs as terrorists; Asians as foreigners, martial artists, and model minorities; 
and people of color in general as lazy, incompetent, disloyal, unpatriotic, and willing 
to lie for each other). 
 422. See Lee, supra note 47, at 482.  
1304 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
The first example of the Specific Racial Stereotypes Instruction 
utilizes the stereotype concerns present in Pena-Rodriguez.423 
Defendant, a Latino man, was on trial for sexual assault of a child.424 
As Pena-Rodriguez’s attorney, I would have been concerned that 
jurors deciding the case might stereotype my client as criminally 
inclined and violent. Another stereotype about Latino “machismo” 
would have been relevant as well.425 The proposed instruction states: 
 
Defendant, a Latino man [or man of Mexican heritage], 
has been charged with harassment, unlawful sexual contact, 
and attempted sexual assault of a child. One of the 
unfortunate truths about our great country is that many of us 
make unfair judgments about others, especially people who 
do not share our race or ethnicity. In this case, there is a risk 
that you will assess the evidence offered in this case and make 
your decision based on widely known but untrue stereotypes 
about Latino men and criminal or violent conduct. It would 
violate the core principles of our justice system to allow these 
stereotypes to impact you. I implore you to resist any urge to 
reach a verdict that is influenced by bias for or against any 
party or witness and to make your decision based solely on 
the evidence presented.  
 
This proposed instruction truthfully explains individuals’ tendency to 
rely on stereotypes, informs jurors of the risk that stereotypes could 
impact them, and urges them to avoid applying the stereotypes. This 
instruction explicitly identifies the stereotypes but moves quickly to a 
firm statement that they are untrue. This instruction makes race and 
the relevant stereotypes salient for jury but leaves no room for them to 
assume that the court supports any sort of reliance on the stereotypes. 
The second example of the Specific Racial Stereotypes 
Instruction uses the same form as the first, but the statement is 
modified based on the stereotype of concern. The second example uses 
a different stereotype concern from Pena-Rodriguez that relates to 
defendant’s alibi witness, who was Latino and purportedly 
                                                   
 423. See generally Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017). 
 424. See id. at 861. 
 425. See Jean Stefancic, Latino and Latina Critical Theory: An Annotated 
Bibliography, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1509, 1571 (1997) (describing the stereotype of Latin 
“machismo” or hyper-masculinity and its impact on domestic violence in Latin 
communities). 
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undocumented.426 As Pena-Rodriguez’s attorney, I would be 
concerned that the jury would apply certain stereotypes when 
assessing the witness’s credibility, including the stereotype that people 
of color are willing to lie for each other and the stereotype that 
undocumented immigrants are dishonest. Even though the concern 
regarding immigration status does not explicitly implicate race, our 
country has made Latin ethnicity a proxy for undocumented 
immigration status.427 The instruction states: 
 
One of Defendant’s witnesses, [insert name] is also a 
Latino man [or man of Mexican heritage], and he is an 
undocumented immigrant. One of the unfortunate truths about 
our great country is that many of us make unfair judgments 
about others, especially people who do not share our race or 
ethnicity. In this case, there is a risk that you will assess this 
witness’s testimony based on widely known but untrue 
stereotypes about Latino immigrants [or undocumented 
immigrants] and dishonesty as well as untrue stereotypes 
about the willingness of people of color to lie for each other. 
It would violate the core principles of our justice system to 
allow these stereotypes to impact you. I implore you to resist 
any urge to assess testimony or reach a verdict that is 
influenced by bias for or against any party or witness and to 
make your decision based solely on the evidence presented.  
 
This proposed instruction focuses specifically on witness credibility 
and the impact of racial stereotypes in this area. The final two 
sentences of the instruction are nearly identical to the first example.  
The final example of the Specific Racial Stereotype Instruction 
would have been helpful for the prosecution in State v. Zimmerman 
trial.428 While this Article has focused exclusively on criminal 
defendants’ right to question and educate jurors on racial bias and 
stereotypes, the Zimmerman trial reminds us that racial stereotypes 
can run rampant in self-defense cases involving victims of color. An 
                                                   
 426. See Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 861. 
 427. See, e.g., United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975) 
(finding that Mexican heritage, together with other factors, would satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonable suspicion requirement such that a border patrol officer 
could lawfully stop a motorist who appears to be Mexican and determine his or her 
immigration status).  
 428. See supra text accompanying notes 146-53 (describing the facts of the 
case).  
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instruction regarding the stereotypes of concern would have been 
helpful for the Zimmerman jury in light of the testimony of Rachel 
Jeantel. The stereotypes at play were the Blacks as unintelligent, 
Blacks as hostile, and Blacks as liars stereotypes. The instruction 
states: 
 
One of prosecution’s witnesses, Rachel Jeantel, is a Black 
woman of Haitian descent.429 One of the unfortunate truths 
about our great country is that many of us make unfair 
judgments about others, especially people who do not share 
our race or ethnicity. In this case, there is a risk that you will 
assess this witness’s testimony based on widely known but 
untrue stereotypes about Blacks as being dishonest, Blacks as 
being less intelligent than Whites, and Blacks as being hostile 
toward others. It would violate the core principles of our 
justice system to allow these stereotypes to impact you. I 
implore you to resist any urge to assess testimony or reach a 
verdict that is influenced by bias for or against any party or 
witness and to make your decision based solely on the 
evidence presented.  
 
This instruction would be most helpful to the jury at the close of all 
evidence as the issues concerning Ms. Jeantel’s intelligence and 
purported hostility did not come to light until her testimony was 
complete. This instruction explicitly states the stereotypes at play, 
making them salient for the jury, and discourages the jury from relying 
on them. 
CONCLUSION 
The proposals contained in this Article are not a magic bullet for 
the racial bias problem that has plagued our justice system for years, 
but as all good Evidence professors likely remind their students, a 
brick is not a wall. As McCormick explains: 
Under our system, molded by the tradition of jury trial and predominantly 
oral proof, a party offers his evidence not en masse, but item by item. An 
item of evidence, being but a single link in the chain of proof, need not 
prove conclusively the proposition for which it is offered.430  
                                                   
 429. See Thompson, supra note 73, at 341. 
 430. See People v. Brooks, 557 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Mich. 1996). 
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Thus, the solutions proposed in this Article cannot fully solve a 
problem that has been institutionalized for centuries. Instead, each 
scholar, researcher, jurist, and attorney must stand on the shoulders of 
the ones who came before them, hoping that they are able to place a 
brick in the wall of justice.  
To achieve the promises of our great country, it is imperative 
that we begin by being honest about our imperfect tendencies. 
Through truthful acknowledgement of the ills of the past and the 
impact those harms continue to have on our country, we can become 
the nation described by the majority in Pena-Rodriguez—a nation that 
can only move forward by confronting the prejudices that threaten our 
way of life.431 
                                                   
 431. See Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 871. 
